I was wondering at about what point that the United States going to war with
the Soviet Union become an almost certain act of mutual destruction. I'm
assuming it sometime in 1960's or 70's, since what I've seen of the Soviet
nuclear capability before that point doesn't seem to be all that
threatening. It looks like they would have been really bad for us
Americans, but not unsurvivable.

--
Goliath & Wildwing's Storage Room
http://anatidae.homestead.com/

james_anatidae wrote:
> I was wondering at about what point that the United States going to
> war with the Soviet Union become an almost certain act of mutual
> destruction. I'm assuming it sometime in 1960's or 70's, since what
> I've seen of the Soviet nuclear capability before that point doesn't
> seem to be all that threatening. It looks like they would have been
> really bad for us Americans, but not unsurvivable.

For both sides, it became unthinkable when a first strike had little chance
of knocking out the opponents nuclear strikeforce. As long as there was a
realistic possiblity that a surprise attack could wipe out US or USSR
strategic nuclear weapons, then I'm some on both sides gave it serious
consideration.

So I'd say MAD became a fact when both sides had deployed sufficient nuclear
armed submarines able to roam the seas largely unseen and hence unstoppable
in a first strike.


--
Nik Simpson

"james_anatidae" > wrote in message
...
> I was wondering at about what point that the United States going to war
with
> the Soviet Union become an almost certain act of mutual destruction. I'm
> assuming it sometime in 1960's or 70's, since what I've seen of the Soviet
> nuclear capability before that point doesn't seem to be all that
> threatening. It looks like they would have been really bad for us
> Americans, but not unsurvivable.

The US was never in a condition to suffer more than 20% casulties;
unthinkable enough.

>From: "Nik Simpson"

>james_anatidae wrote:
>> I was wondering at about what point that the United States going to
>> war with the Soviet Union become an almost certain act of mutual
>> destruction. I'm assuming it sometime in 1960's or 70's, since what
>> I've seen of the Soviet nuclear capability before that point doesn't
>> seem to be all that threatening. It looks like they would have been
>> really bad for us Americans, but not unsurvivable.
>
>For both sides, it became unthinkable when a first strike had little chance
>of knocking out the opponents nuclear strikeforce. As long as there was a
>realistic possiblity that a surprise attack could wipe out US or USSR
>strategic nuclear weapons, then I'm some on both sides gave it serious
>consideration.
>
>So I'd say MAD became a fact when both sides had deployed sufficient nuclear
>armed submarines able to roam the seas largely unseen and hence unstoppable
>in a first strike.
>
>
>--
>Nik Simpson
>
In my opinion it was a very bad idea before MAD. Had Patton got his way and we
invaded the Soviet Union, even with the 20 nukes he theorized we would need, it
would have been impossible to win. The Soviets didn't disarm as the U.S. did
since Joseph "they are out to get me" Stalin was convinced the West was going
to invade. They were willing to accept huge casualties just as they had with
the Nazis.

The Soviets might have been able to take all of Europe if they tried hard
enough, but they had no way to directly attack the U.S. at the time. If they
wanted to invade the U.S. they would have had to do it through Alaska which
would be suicidal.

Dan. U.S. Air Force, retired

"Nik Simpson" > wrote in message
...
> james_anatidae wrote:
> > I was wondering at about what point that the United States going to
> > war with the Soviet Union become an almost certain act of mutual
> > destruction. I'm assuming it sometime in 1960's or 70's, since what
> > I've seen of the Soviet nuclear capability before that point doesn't
> > seem to be all that threatening. It looks like they would have been
> > really bad for us Americans, but not unsurvivable.
>
> For both sides, it became unthinkable when a first strike had little
chance
> of knocking out the opponents nuclear strikeforce. As long as there was a
> realistic possiblity that a surprise attack could wipe out US or USSR
> strategic nuclear weapons, then I'm some on both sides gave it serious
> consideration.
>
> So I'd say MAD became a fact when both sides had deployed sufficient
nuclear
> armed submarines able to roam the seas largely unseen and hence
unstoppable
> in a first strike.
>

Even before that the B-52's flying on alert ensured that the
Soviets couldnt rely on a first strike knocking out the US
strategic response.

Keith




----== Posted via Newsfeed.Com - Unlimited-Uncensored-Secure Usenet News==----
http://www.newsfeed.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! >100,000 Newsgroups
---= 19 East/West-Coast Specialized Servers - Total Privacy via Encryption =---

Keith Willshaw wrote:
> "Nik Simpson" > wrote in message
> ...
>> james_anatidae wrote:
>>> I was wondering at about what point that the United States going to
>>> war with the Soviet Union become an almost certain act of mutual
>>> destruction. I'm assuming it sometime in 1960's or 70's, since what
>>> I've seen of the Soviet nuclear capability before that point doesn't
>>> seem to be all that threatening. It looks like they would have been
>>> really bad for us Americans, but not unsurvivable.
>>
>> For both sides, it became unthinkable when a first strike had little
> chance
>> of knocking out the opponents nuclear strikeforce. As long as there was a
>> realistic possiblity that a surprise attack could wipe out US or USSR
>> strategic nuclear weapons, then I'm some on both sides gave it serious
>> consideration.
>>
>> So I'd say MAD became a fact when both sides had deployed sufficient
> nuclear
>> armed submarines able to roam the seas largely unseen and hence
> unstoppable
>> in a first strike.
>>
>
> Even before that the B-52's flying on alert ensured that the
> Soviets couldnt rely on a first strike knocking out the US
> strategic response.

AIR, the "dew line" was established to give us 20 minutes notice of inbound
Soviet missiles, wasn't it? If so, I think the actual time when MAD became our
joint policies would have been in the middle fifties, or perhaps even a little
bit earlier, to coincide with our government having learned that the Soviets had
stolen our nuclear secrets and were acting on them.

George Z.

"George Z. Bush" wrote:

> AIR, the "dew line" was established to give us 20 minutes notice of inbound
> Soviet missiles, wasn't it? If so, I think the actual time when MAD became our
> joint policies would have been in the middle fifties, or perhaps even a little
> bit earlier, to coincide with our government having learned that the Soviets had
> stolen our nuclear secrets and were acting on them.
>
> George Z.


The DEW line was for air-breathers (bombers in those days) now replaced
by North Warning.

BMEWS (Ballistic Missile Warning System) was the missile warning system
based in Alaska, Greenland and the U.K.

Dave

In article >,
"George Z. Bush" > writes:
>
> AIR, the "dew line" was established to give us 20 minutes notice of inbound
> Soviet missiles, wasn't it? If so, I think the actual time when MAD became our
> joint policies would have been in the middle fifties, or perhaps even a little
> bit earlier, to coincide with our government having learned that the Soviets had
> stolen our nuclear secrets and were acting on them.

The DEW Line was the line of conventional radar stations roughly along
the Arctic Circle. Not much good against ICBMs, but you'd get at
least an hour's "heads up" for a Bison/Bear/B-52 type transonic
bomber (and at least 2 hours vs. something like a Tu-4) reaching the
boundaries of the Contigous Radar Cover that began with the Mid-Canada
Line and ran all the way down to the U.S. Southern borders. They'd
have to grind their way down for an equivalant length of time to have
any worthwhile targets to hit - most of Candada's ppopulation, and
thus anything worth hitting, is within 200 miles of the U.S. border.

Once they hit the contiguous radar cover, theyre'd be enough tracking
information to allow them to be intercepted by whatever NORAD had at
the time. And there was an awful lot of NORAD, back then. When SAGE
came along in the late '50s, it became almost impossible to saturate
the defences, since the weak link - Human controllers sending voice
commands to the Interceptors - wasn't as important. I wouldn't
have wanted to in the Soviet Long Range Aviation, that's for sure.

That's one of the things that pushed the Soviets toward ICBMs rather
than somewhat bigger/faster winged aircraft (M-50 anyone?) that didn't
have a much better chance against the defences than teh slower
airplanes.

BMEWS was the response to the threat of ICBMs coming over the Pole.
But, in some ways, we were still further along than the Soviets wer in
building and deploying useful ICBMs and SLBMs. Kruschev was great at
showing off spactacular feats of missilery, and veiled, and not so
veiled threats to use his missiles, but that wasn't backed up by what
was in the field. Consider, if you will, that if the Soviets had had
a viable ICBM or SLBM force in 1962, they wouldn't have tried putting
the short-range missiles in Cuba. That whole business grew out of the
Soviet's knowledge that they couldn't effectively strike. (Either First
Strike or Second Strike)

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

Dave Holford wrote:
> "George Z. Bush" wrote:
>
>> AIR, the "dew line" was established to give us 20 minutes notice of inbound
>> Soviet missiles, wasn't it? If so, I think the actual time when MAD became
>> our joint policies would have been in the middle fifties, or perhaps even a
>> little bit earlier, to coincide with our government having learned that the
>> Soviets had stolen our nuclear secrets and were acting on them.
>>
>> George Z.
>
>
> The DEW line was for air-breathers (bombers in those days) now replaced
> by North Warning.
>
> BMEWS (Ballistic Missile Warning System) was the missile warning system
> based in Alaska, Greenland and the U.K.

Picky! Picky! So when did BMEWS become operational? We're trying to figure out
when MAD became the joint policies of the US and the USSR. You got any input?

George Z.
>
> Dave

Peter Stickney wrote:
> In article >,
> "George Z. Bush" > writes:
>>
>> AIR, the "dew line" was established to give us 20 minutes notice of inbound
>> Soviet missiles, wasn't it? If so, I think the actual time when MAD became
>> our joint policies would have been in the middle fifties, or perhaps even a
>> little bit earlier, to coincide with our government having learned that the
>> Soviets had stolen our nuclear secrets and were acting on them.
>
> The DEW Line was the line of conventional radar stations roughly along
> the Arctic Circle. Not much good against ICBMs, but you'd get at
> least an hour's "heads up" for a Bison/Bear/B-52 type transonic
> bomber (and at least 2 hours vs. something like a Tu-4) reaching the
> boundaries of the Contigous Radar Cover that began with the Mid-Canada
> Line and ran all the way down to the U.S. Southern borders. They'd
> have to grind their way down for an equivalant length of time to have
> any worthwhile targets to hit - most of Candada's ppopulation, and
> thus anything worth hitting, is within 200 miles of the U.S. border.
>
> Once they hit the contiguous radar cover, theyre'd be enough tracking
> information to allow them to be intercepted by whatever NORAD had at
> the time. And there was an awful lot of NORAD, back then. When SAGE
> came along in the late '50s, it became almost impossible to saturate
> the defences, since the weak link - Human controllers sending voice
> commands to the Interceptors - wasn't as important. I wouldn't
> have wanted to in the Soviet Long Range Aviation, that's for sure.
>
> That's one of the things that pushed the Soviets toward ICBMs rather
> than somewhat bigger/faster winged aircraft (M-50 anyone?) that didn't
> have a much better chance against the defences than teh slower
> airplanes.
>
> BMEWS was the response to the threat of ICBMs coming over the Pole.
> But, in some ways, we were still further along than the Soviets wer in
> building and deploying useful ICBMs and SLBMs. Kruschev was great at
> showing off spactacular feats of missilery, and veiled, and not so
> veiled threats to use his missiles, but that wasn't backed up by what
> was in the field. Consider, if you will, that if the Soviets had had
> a viable ICBM or SLBM force in 1962, they wouldn't have tried putting
> the short-range missiles in Cuba. That whole business grew out of the
> Soviet's knowledge that they couldn't effectively strike. (Either First
> Strike or Second Strike)

That was all very interesting, and certainly did much to refresh flagging
memories. However, it still didn't resolve the starting date for MAD, because
it ignored the ongoing SAC airborne alerts and the nuclear armed subs roaming
the oceans. I personally have the feeling that the MAD doctrine evolved from
recognition of those SAC policies by the Soviets, which would place the date at
or before construction of the DEW line.

All guesswork on my part. What do you think?

George Z.

"Peter Skelton" > wrote in message
...
> On Mon, 23 Feb 2004 11:14:56 -0500, "George Z. Bush"
> > wrote:
>
> >Peter Stickney wrote:
> >> In article >,
> >> "George Z. Bush" > writes:
> >>>
> >>> AIR, the "dew line" was established to give us 20 minutes notice of
inbound
> >>> Soviet missiles, wasn't it? If so, I think the actual time when MAD
became
> >>> our joint policies would have been in the middle fifties, or perhaps even
a
> >>> little bit earlier, to coincide with our government having learned that
the
> >>> Soviets had stolen our nuclear secrets and were acting on them.
> >>
> >> The DEW Line was the line of conventional radar stations roughly along
> >> the Arctic Circle. Not much good against ICBMs, but you'd get at
> >> least an hour's "heads up" for a Bison/Bear/B-52 type transonic
> >> bomber (and at least 2 hours vs. something like a Tu-4) reaching the
> >> boundaries of the Contigous Radar Cover that began with the Mid-Canada
> >> Line and ran all the way down to the U.S. Southern borders. They'd
> >> have to grind their way down for an equivalant length of time to have
> >> any worthwhile targets to hit - most of Candada's ppopulation, and
> >> thus anything worth hitting, is within 200 miles of the U.S. border.
> >>
> >> Once they hit the contiguous radar cover, theyre'd be enough tracking
> >> information to allow them to be intercepted by whatever NORAD had at
> >> the time. And there was an awful lot of NORAD, back then. When SAGE
> >> came along in the late '50s, it became almost impossible to saturate
> >> the defences, since the weak link - Human controllers sending voice
> >> commands to the Interceptors - wasn't as important. I wouldn't
> >> have wanted to in the Soviet Long Range Aviation, that's for sure.
> >>
> >> That's one of the things that pushed the Soviets toward ICBMs rather
> >> than somewhat bigger/faster winged aircraft (M-50 anyone?) that didn't
> >> have a much better chance against the defences than teh slower
> >> airplanes.
> >>
> >> BMEWS was the response to the threat of ICBMs coming over the Pole.
> >> But, in some ways, we were still further along than the Soviets wer in
> >> building and deploying useful ICBMs and SLBMs. Kruschev was great at
> >> showing off spactacular feats of missilery, and veiled, and not so
> >> veiled threats to use his missiles, but that wasn't backed up by what
> >> was in the field. Consider, if you will, that if the Soviets had had
> >> a viable ICBM or SLBM force in 1962, they wouldn't have tried putting
> >> the short-range missiles in Cuba. That whole business grew out of the
> >> Soviet's knowledge that they couldn't effectively strike. (Either First
> >> Strike or Second Strike)
> >
> >That was all very interesting, and certainly did much to refresh flagging
> >memories. However, it still didn't resolve the starting date for MAD,
because
> >it ignored the ongoing SAC airborne alerts and the nuclear armed subs roaming
> >the oceans. I personally have the feeling that the MAD doctrine evolved from
> >recognition of those SAC policies by the Soviets, which would place the date
at
> >or before construction of the DEW line.
> >
> >All guesswork on my part. What do you think?
> >
> MAD started when the West recognized the Soviet's ability to
> destroy it. That's after the DEW line was installed (1957), after
> all the DEW line was part of a system designed and expected to
> prevent bomber penetration.
>
> MacNamarra stated in his book that the US was deterred from a
> strike by the Soviets 550 warheads in 1962 (Cuban crisis), so MAD
> was operating at that time, although not named yet. If he is not
> correct, the 1963 test ban treaty is further evidence that the
> situation was recognized.
>
> Most of what I have here says "mid-sixties."
>
> It's an interesting question.

Not only interesting, but refreshingly free of current political content.
Thanks for your input.
(*-*)))

George Z.

George Z. Bush wrtoe in response to Peter Skelton's commentary:

>Not only interesting, but refreshingly free of current political content.
>Thanks for your input.
>(*-*)))

I agree that it was a good effort, but don't let anyone tell Art that Air
National Guard interceptors were part of the NORAD forces.

Rick Clark

"OXMORON1" > wrote in message
...
> George Z. Bush wrtoe in response to Peter Skelton's commentary:
>
> >Not only interesting, but refreshingly free of current political content.
> >Thanks for your input.
> >(*-*)))
>
> I agree that it was a good effort, but don't let anyone tell Art that Air
> National Guard interceptors were part of the NORAD forces.

Or that we were a first strike target.

"George Z. Bush" > wrote in message
...
> Dave Holford wrote:
> > "George Z. Bush" wrote:
> >
> >> AIR, the "dew line" was established to give us 20 minutes notice of
inbound
> >> Soviet missiles, wasn't it? If so, I think the actual time when MAD
became
> >> our joint policies would have been in the middle fifties, or perhaps even
a
> >> little bit earlier, to coincide with our government having learned that
the
> >> Soviets had stolen our nuclear secrets and were acting on them.
> >>
> >> George Z.
> >
> >
> > The DEW line was for air-breathers (bombers in those days) now replaced
> > by North Warning.
> >
> > BMEWS (Ballistic Missile Warning System) was the missile warning system
> > based in Alaska, Greenland and the U.K.
>
> Picky! Picky! So when did BMEWS become operational? We're trying to figure
out
> when MAD became the joint policies of the US and the USSR. You got any
input?
>
> George Z.

MAD was never a "joint policy" at any time. The idea of MAD goes back a long
way in war planning. It was derived from the game theory guys at the war
colleges. The pentagon generals gave it attention in the years after Sputnik.
I think LeMay was an early advocate. Exactly when it was adopted by the
politicians is unknown but it was in effect before it was publicly
ackowledged by McNamara. If the Martians attacked, it would be put into
effect.

"james_anatidae" > wrote in message >...
> I was wondering at about what point that the United States going to war with
> the Soviet Union become an almost certain act of mutual destruction. I'm
> assuming it sometime in 1960's or 70's, since what I've seen of the Soviet
> nuclear capability before that point doesn't seem to be all that
> threatening. It looks like they would have been really bad for us
> Americans, but not unsurvivable.

The war with the CCCP became suicidal, about
40 years before nuclear weapons were even invented,
in about 1900.
Since we been telling both the idiot Russian
Soviet leaders, and the equally moronic
US Congress since that time, that the
US war in Europe has nothing to do with either
nuclear weapons, tanks, AK-47s or survival.

It simply concerns the conditions of survival.

"George Z. Bush" > wrote in message >...
> AIR, the "dew line" was established to give us 20 minutes notice of inbound
> Soviet missiles, wasn't it? If so, I think the actual time when MAD became our
> joint policies would have been in the middle fifties, or perhaps even a little
> bit earlier, to coincide with our government having learned that the Soviets had
> stolen our nuclear secrets and were acting on them.
>
> George Z.

If you can point to an official statement from either the whitehouse
or the kremlin that MAD was a "policy", I'd be very interested. My
understanding, from it being beaten into my skull by someone in the US
thinktank industry, is that MAD was NOT a policy, it was a highly
abbraviated expression of the consequences of a large scale nuclear
exchange.

In article >,
(Gareth B) wrote:

> If you can point to an official statement from either the whitehouse
> or the kremlin that MAD was a "policy", I'd be very interested. My
> understanding, from it being beaten into my skull by someone in the US
> thinktank industry, is that MAD was NOT a policy, it was a highly
> abbraviated expression of the consequences of a large scale nuclear
> exchange.

<http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/12/documents/mcnamara.dete
rrence/>

Pretty much an official summation of "assured destruction," later called
"Mutual Assured Destruction." Not just an acknowledgement of
consequences, but a statement of policy.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

"ZZBunker" > wrote in message .
>
> The war with the CCCP became suicidal, about
> 40 years before nuclear weapons were even invented,
> in about 1900.

So...almost a decade before the Soviet Union existed....An interesting
viewpont.

Nick P. Norwood

In article >,
"George Z. Bush" > writes:
> Peter Stickney wrote:

>> BMEWS was the response to the threat of ICBMs coming over the Pole.
>> But, in some ways, we were still further along than the Soviets wer in
>> building and deploying useful ICBMs and SLBMs. Kruschev was great at
>> showing off spactacular feats of missilery, and veiled, and not so
>> veiled threats to use his missiles, but that wasn't backed up by what
>> was in the field. Consider, if you will, that if the Soviets had had
>> a viable ICBM or SLBM force in 1962, they wouldn't have tried putting
>> the short-range missiles in Cuba. That whole business grew out of the
>> Soviet's knowledge that they couldn't effectively strike. (Either First
>> Strike or Second Strike)
>
> That was all very interesting, and certainly did much to refresh flagging
> memories. However, it still didn't resolve the starting date for
> MAD, because
> it ignored the ongoing SAC airborne alerts and the nuclear armed subs roaming
> the oceans. I personally have the feeling that the MAD doctrine evolved from
> recognition of those SAC policies by the Soviets, which would place
> the date at
> or before construction of the DEW line.
> All guesswork on my part. What do you think?

Well, just my opinion, of course, but I think that the MAD thinking
didn't occur until the mid '60s. It really didn't get set in stone
until it was decided to limit the deployment of the Spartan/Safeguard
ABM system, which occurred before the negotiation of the ABM Treaty
which occurred in 1972. The Soviets, of course, had been trying with
all possible strength to get systems in place to deliver their nukes
all through the 1950s. As I pointed out before, air-breathers -
Bombers and Cruise Missiles, weren't going to cut it, at least in our
mutual perceptions. (Since it never got tried for real) The Soviets
put more efforts into their ICBM projects than we did, but their
progress wasn't as fast as they wished, so they propagandized the hell
out of it, making themselves look much more powerful than they were,
and hoped that we either wouldn't find out, or wouldn't call the
bluff. (All that Missile Gap stuff in the 1960 election, for
example.)
So the Soviets had been trying to present a credible force for quite a
while, but weren't really there.

All through the 1950s, the Soviets didn't have any confidence in their
ability to put bombs on target, The idea of MAD, which is more a
Western conceit, rather than a bilateral policy, didn't come about
until the Soviets had a significant and reliable ICBM force. This
didn't happen until the mid '60s, at best, with their development of
storable-fuel ICBMs, and the Yankee Class Ballistic Missile Subs.
That feeling of inferiority, after all, was what drove Kruschev to try
to put the short and medium range missiles in Cuba in 1962. They knew
that they were going to come off second best against what we had, and
counted on holding the initialtive and being agressive to make the
differnece. It didn't work that way, and that's the main reason why
Khruschev was chucked out - he scared the Supreme Soviet more than he
scared us. (And mind you, he was plenty scarey)

There's no definite indication tha the Soviet Heirarchy ever really
bought into the idea of MAD. The Soviets, don't forget, were perfectly
willing to trade vast numbers of their population for their system's
survival. The communization of the Ukraine, and the scorched-earch
strategies used in WW 2 are ample examples of that.

But then, this is one of those things that is really a matter of
trying to nail Jello to the wall - since it was never a stated,
formal, policy, but more an attitude and set of perceptions.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

"james_anatidae" > wrote in message >...
> I was wondering at about what point that the United States going to war with
> the Soviet Union become an almost certain act of mutual destruction. I'm
> assuming it sometime in 1960's or 70's, since what I've seen of the Soviet
> nuclear capability before that point doesn't seem to be all that
> threatening. It looks like they would have been really bad for us
> Americans, but not unsurvivable.

Even now it is survivable. According to different esimates
some 10-20% of population of each country have some chances
to survive even in full scale nuclear war. But the damage
is simply unacceptable for both sides. As far as I understand
even one bomb explosion in center of a big city in US or Russia
is totaly unacceptable for any side.

Michael

(Peter Stickney) wrote in message >...
> In article >,
> "George Z. Bush" > writes:
> > Peter Stickney wrote:
>
> >> BMEWS was the response to the threat of ICBMs coming over the Pole.
> >> But, in some ways, we were still further along than the Soviets wer in
> >> building and deploying useful ICBMs and SLBMs. Kruschev was great at
> >> showing off spactacular feats of missilery, and veiled, and not so
> >> veiled threats to use his missiles, but that wasn't backed up by what
> >> was in the field. Consider, if you will, that if the Soviets had had
> >> a viable ICBM or SLBM force in 1962, they wouldn't have tried putting
> >> the short-range missiles in Cuba. That whole business grew out of the
> >> Soviet's knowledge that they couldn't effectively strike. (Either First
> >> Strike or Second Strike)
> >
> > That was all very interesting, and certainly did much to refresh flagging
> > memories. However, it still didn't resolve the starting date for
> > MAD, because
> > it ignored the ongoing SAC airborne alerts and the nuclear armed subs roaming
> > the oceans. I personally have the feeling that the MAD doctrine evolved from
> > recognition of those SAC policies by the Soviets, which would place
> > the date at
> > or before construction of the DEW line.
> > All guesswork on my part. What do you think?
>
> Well, just my opinion, of course, but I think that the MAD thinking
> didn't occur until the mid '60s. It really didn't get set in stone
> until it was decided to limit the deployment of the Spartan/Safeguard
> ABM system, which occurred before the negotiation of the ABM Treaty
> which occurred in 1972. The Soviets, of course, had been trying with
> all possible strength to get systems in place to deliver their nukes
> all through the 1950s. As I pointed out before, air-breathers -
> Bombers and Cruise Missiles, weren't going to cut it, at least in our
> mutual perceptions. (Since it never got tried for real) The Soviets
> put more efforts into their ICBM projects than we did, but their
> progress wasn't as fast as they wished, so they propagandized the hell
> out of it, making themselves look much more powerful than they were,
> and hoped that we either wouldn't find out, or wouldn't call the
> bluff. (All that Missile Gap stuff in the 1960 election, for
> example.)
> So the Soviets had been trying to present a credible force for quite a
> while, but weren't really there.
>
> All through the 1950s, the Soviets didn't have any confidence in their
> ability to put bombs on target, The idea of MAD, which is more a
> Western conceit, rather than a bilateral policy, didn't come about
> until the Soviets had a significant and reliable ICBM force. This
> didn't happen until the mid '60s, at best, with their development of
> storable-fuel ICBMs, and the Yankee Class Ballistic Missile Subs.
> That feeling of inferiority, after all, was what drove Kruschev to try
> to put the short and medium range missiles in Cuba in 1962. They knew
> that they were going to come off second best against what we had, and
> counted on holding the initialtive and being agressive to make the
> differnece. It didn't work that way, and that's the main reason why
> Khruschev was chucked out - he scared the Supreme Soviet more than he
> scared us. (And mind you, he was plenty scarey)
>
> There's no definite indication tha the Soviet Heirarchy ever really
> bought into the idea of MAD. The Soviets, don't forget, were perfectly
> willing to trade vast numbers of their population for their system's
> survival. The communization of the Ukraine, and the scorched-earch
> strategies used in WW 2 are ample examples of that.
>
> But then, this is one of those things that is really a matter of
> trying to nail Jello to the wall - since it was never a stated,
> formal, policy, but more an attitude and set of perceptions.

I will have to dig them out but Herman Kahn did a whole series of
books in the 1950s On Thermonuclear Warfare, Thinking About the
Unthinkable, Will the Survivors Envy the Dead? The whole wonderful
gamut of 'what do we do with this terrible thing we have made?'. The
kernel of MAD was there in the 1950s, part of the massive retaliation
concept that begat the doomsday bomb idea which put a lot of SAC
colonels in analysis or homes.
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj97/win97/parrin.html

"MAD, of course, is an evolutionary defense strategy based on the
concept that neither the United States nor its enemies will ever start
a nuclear war because the other side will retaliate massively and
unacceptably. MAD is a product of the 1950s' US doctrine of massive
retaliation, and despite attempts to redefine it in contemporary terms
like flexible response and nuclear deterrence, it has remained the
central theme of American defense planning for well over three
decades.2 But MAD was developed during a time of unreliable missile
technology and was based on a mortal fear of Communism, aggravated by
ignorance of an unknown enemy that lurked behind an iron curtain.
Times have changed. Missile guidance improvements have eliminated the
need for multiple targeting by redundant weapon systems. More
importantly, our enemies have changed as have our fears about
Communist domination. It is time to rethink our baseline defense
strategy and the doctrine behind it. "

"james_anatidae" > wrote in message >...
> I was wondering at about what point that the United States going to war with
> the Soviet Union become an almost certain act of mutual destruction. I'm
> assuming it sometime in 1960's or 70's, since what I've seen of the Soviet
> nuclear capability before that point doesn't seem to be all that
> threatening. It looks like they would have been really bad for us
> Americans, but not unsurvivable.

Depends on where you are. Much of the WWII doctrine carried over into
the Cold War, the Soviets seeing nuclear weapons as a way of clearing
the enemy out of a retricted front area without all that probing
necessary under the conventional weapons useage. It was only after
about 20 years that they realized that sword was not singled edged,
those who survived would want to strike back. The Soviets stationed a
large number of SS-11s at Tatishchevo in an attempt to create a
theater force until the road mobile SS-20s and follow-ons were
available. We countered with Pershing IIs.

The Soviets believe that a conventional war in Europe might escalate
to the nuclear level despite their oft-repeated commitment to no
first-use of nuclear weapons, the Soviets have developed extensive
plans either to preempt a NATO nuclear strike by launching a massive
attack, or to launch a massive first strike against prime NATO targets
should their conventional operations falter.

"Nick P. Norwood" > wrote in message news:<HzA_b.143$44.130@newsfe1-win>...
> "ZZBunker" > wrote in message .
> >
> > The war with the CCCP became suicidal, about
> > 40 years before nuclear weapons were even invented,
> > in about 1900.
>
> So...almost a decade before the Soviet Union existed....An interesting
> viewpont.

The Soviet Union was nothing but a moronic
European Spy Ring and Political legality
created by retatded Russian Lawyers and Josef Stalin.

The CCCP was created by Lenin et al.




> Nick P. Norwood

"james_anatidae" > wrote in message >...
> I was wondering at about what point that the United States going to war with
> the Soviet Union become an almost certain act of mutual destruction. I'm
> assuming it sometime in 1960's or 70's, since what I've seen of the Soviet
> nuclear capability before that point doesn't seem to be all that
> threatening. It looks like they would have been really bad for us
> Americans, but not unsurvivable.

I think October 23, 1961 is a watershed date. That is the day that
the Soviet Union exploded the Tsar Bomba, the largest bomb ever
exploded.

Note that the yield of this bomb did not represent the technical limit
on the yield of a hydrogen bomb. It is my understanding that there is
no known limit. Instead, the Tsar Bomba represents a kind of
political limit in a historical context. After the Tsar Bomba, the
politicians on both side put on the brakes.

"Tom Adams" > wrote in message
om...
> "james_anatidae" > wrote in message
>...
> > I was wondering at about what point that the United States going to war
with
> > the Soviet Union become an almost certain act of mutual destruction.
I'm
> > assuming it sometime in 1960's or 70's, since what I've seen of the
Soviet
> > nuclear capability before that point doesn't seem to be all that
> > threatening. It looks like they would have been really bad for us
> > Americans, but not unsurvivable.
>
> I think October 23, 1961 is a watershed date. That is the day that
> the Soviet Union exploded the Tsar Bomba, the largest bomb ever
> exploded.
>
> Note that the yield of this bomb did not represent the technical limit
> on the yield of a hydrogen bomb. It is my understanding that there is
> no known limit. Instead, the Tsar Bomba represents a kind of
> political limit in a historical context. After the Tsar Bomba, the
> politicians on both side put on the brakes.

The Tsar bomb is blamed for an ozone hole. Maximizing a hydrogen bomb and
detonating it might be game over for us all.

"Jack Linthicum" > wrote in message
om...
> (Peter Stickney) wrote in message
>...
> > In article >,
> > "George Z. Bush" > writes:
> > > Peter Stickney wrote:
> >
> > >> BMEWS was the response to the threat of ICBMs coming over the Pole.
> > >> But, in some ways, we were still further along than the Soviets wer
in
> > >> building and deploying useful ICBMs and SLBMs. Kruschev was great at
> > >> showing off spactacular feats of missilery, and veiled, and not so
> > >> veiled threats to use his missiles, but that wasn't backed up by what
> > >> was in the field. Consider, if you will, that if the Soviets had had
> > >> a viable ICBM or SLBM force in 1962, they wouldn't have tried putting
> > >> the short-range missiles in Cuba. That whole business grew out of
the
> > >> Soviet's knowledge that they couldn't effectively strike. (Either
First
> > >> Strike or Second Strike)
> > >
> > > That was all very interesting, and certainly did much to refresh
flagging
> > > memories. However, it still didn't resolve the starting date for
> > > MAD, because
> > > it ignored the ongoing SAC airborne alerts and the nuclear armed subs
roaming
> > > the oceans. I personally have the feeling that the MAD doctrine
evolved from
> > > recognition of those SAC policies by the Soviets, which would place
> > > the date at
> > > or before construction of the DEW line.
> > > All guesswork on my part. What do you think?
> >
> > Well, just my opinion, of course, but I think that the MAD thinking
> > didn't occur until the mid '60s. It really didn't get set in stone
> > until it was decided to limit the deployment of the Spartan/Safeguard
> > ABM system, which occurred before the negotiation of the ABM Treaty
> > which occurred in 1972. The Soviets, of course, had been trying with
> > all possible strength to get systems in place to deliver their nukes
> > all through the 1950s. As I pointed out before, air-breathers -
> > Bombers and Cruise Missiles, weren't going to cut it, at least in our
> > mutual perceptions. (Since it never got tried for real) The Soviets
> > put more efforts into their ICBM projects than we did, but their
> > progress wasn't as fast as they wished, so they propagandized the hell
> > out of it, making themselves look much more powerful than they were,
> > and hoped that we either wouldn't find out, or wouldn't call the
> > bluff. (All that Missile Gap stuff in the 1960 election, for
> > example.)
> > So the Soviets had been trying to present a credible force for quite a
> > while, but weren't really there.
> >
> > All through the 1950s, the Soviets didn't have any confidence in their
> > ability to put bombs on target, The idea of MAD, which is more a
> > Western conceit, rather than a bilateral policy, didn't come about
> > until the Soviets had a significant and reliable ICBM force. This
> > didn't happen until the mid '60s, at best, with their development of
> > storable-fuel ICBMs, and the Yankee Class Ballistic Missile Subs.
> > That feeling of inferiority, after all, was what drove Kruschev to try
> > to put the short and medium range missiles in Cuba in 1962. They knew
> > that they were going to come off second best against what we had, and
> > counted on holding the initialtive and being agressive to make the
> > differnece. It didn't work that way, and that's the main reason why
> > Khruschev was chucked out - he scared the Supreme Soviet more than he
> > scared us. (And mind you, he was plenty scarey)
> >
> > There's no definite indication tha the Soviet Heirarchy ever really
> > bought into the idea of MAD. The Soviets, don't forget, were perfectly
> > willing to trade vast numbers of their population for their system's
> > survival. The communization of the Ukraine, and the scorched-earch
> > strategies used in WW 2 are ample examples of that.

"Soviet Hierarchy" is a bit difficult to evaluate.

Khruschev however definitely did buy into the idea.

> The
> kernel of MAD was there in the 1950s, part of the massive retaliation
> concept that begat the doomsday bomb idea which put a lot of SAC
> colonels in analysis or homes.
>
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj97/win97/parrin.html
>
> "MAD, of course, is an evolutionary defense strategy based on the
> concept that neither the United States nor its enemies will ever start
> a nuclear war because the other side will retaliate massively and
> unacceptably. MAD is a product of the 1950s' US doctrine of massive
> retaliation, and despite attempts to redefine it in contemporary terms
> like flexible response and nuclear deterrence, it has remained the
> central theme of American defense planning for well over three
> decades.

I think this is getting "assured destruction" a bit backward. It is related
to "massive retaliation", and like MR it promises devastating consequences.
But devastating firepower was inherited from the 50s, with 20,000 Mt in the
US arsenal.

Assured destruction was McNamara's strategy to *restrain* U.S. nuclear
firepower to something with some arguably sane and affordable basis. MR
never defined what level of destruction was *required* to deter the CCCP, it
was a "give'em all we've got" type of thing.

McNamara defined a level of destruction against which U.S. weapons programs
could be measured: 20-33% of the Soviet population (and, unlike WWII, this
would be mostly made up of the *entire* population of the major cities, even
including Party members), and 50-75% of industry. And it turned out that
this required only 300 equivalent megatons. Remember when McNamara
propounded this the USAF wanted to build 10,000 Minuteman missiles. What
they got was "only" 1000, or about 1100 equivalent from this weapon system
alone.

It was never the idea of the U.S. that AD should be MAD, if the U.S. could
have prevented the CCCP from acquiring AD capability (short of preemptive
nuclear war) it would have. Problem was, the US couldn't, any more than the
CCCP could deny this capability to the US. An interest in ABM weapons in the
late 60s gave way, once MIRVing began and the realization set in that this
would be a very costly arms race in which both sides would lose. That is,
both sides would remain vulnerable despite staggering expenditures in ABM
weapons, since the significantly less costly (but still expensive)
counter-deployment of MIRVs would defeat it. Bankrupt, vulnerable, and
instead of sitting on a pile of 20,000 warheads, they would be sitting on
maybe 200,000. Hence the ABM treaty.

Carey Sublette

Comments:
1) It is true that there is no theoretical limit to the size of a TNW.
The practical limit is when the bomb vents to space rather than
expanding across the surface of the earth. Big bombs are impractical
since they blow the hell out of the hypocenter (spot directly under
the bomb) but the radius of destruction increases as the cube root of
the bomb's yield. One could take the same amount of critical material
and make numerous smaller bombs and achieve a much greater area of
destruction by carefully distributing them over the target zone.

2) I should think doctrine on the possible use of nuclear weapons took
a serious hit when a real sober look was taken of the two nuclear
accidents the USSR experienced - Chelyabinsk and Chernobyl. The USSR
never ever achieved the capability to feed all its people from its own
resources and what fallout from numerous nuclear weapons would do to
the arable lands of the Ukraine really doesn't bear thinking about.

3) FWIW I spent those Cold War years in Air Defense Command as an 86D,
102 and 104 pilot on active air defense alert, usually every third
day, from 1954 through 1967, when I went to TAC and the F4. One got a
real serious attitude about the Air Defense mission back then.

Walt BJ

(WaltBJ) wrote:

>Comments:
>1) It is true that there is no theoretical limit to the size of a TNW.
>The practical limit is when the bomb vents to space rather than
>expanding across the surface of the earth. Big bombs are impractical
>since they blow the hell out of the hypocenter (spot directly under
>the bomb) but the radius of destruction increases as the cube root of
>the bomb's yield. One could take the same amount of critical material
>and make numerous smaller bombs and achieve a much greater area of
>destruction by carefully distributing them over the target zone.

Yes, but when the Soviet Union was first developing their ICBM's, they
had all that launch potential but little accuracy. They had to use
large warheads in order to make sure they hit their targets. As they
developed better technology, though, the accuracy improved and they
began MRV-ing and then MIRV-ing those huge missiles.

IMO a nuclear war became suicidal between the US and USSR when the
Soviets began fielding a decent sized ICBM fleet. They would have had
to use a "launch on warning" command or our more accurate missiles
would have destroyed theirs in their silos, but from that point on
both sides had the capability to destroy the other. Once the Soviets
sent enough missiles to sea in subs, though, MAD became a certainty.

John Lansford
--
The unofficial I-26 Construction Webpage:
http://users.vnet.net/lansford/a10/

"WaltBJ" > wrote in message
om...
> Comments:
> 1) It is true that there is no theoretical limit to the size of a TNW.
> The practical limit is when the bomb vents to space rather than
> expanding across the surface of the earth. Big bombs are impractical
> since they blow the hell out of the hypocenter (spot directly under
> the bomb) but the radius of destruction increases as the cube root of
> the bomb's yield. One could take the same amount of critical material
> and make numerous smaller bombs and achieve a much greater area of
> destruction by carefully distributing them over the target zone.

The fundamental reason why 'Ivan', the Tsar Bomba, had no relevance to the
strategic balance was that it was undeliverable against the U.S. The weight
of this bomb - 27 tonnes - was nearly equal to the Tu-95's maximum payload,
and two and a half times its normal weapon load. Range of the Tu-95 was
already marginal for attacking the U.S. even with a normal bomb load. Even
worse, since the bomb's dimensions - 2 meters wide and 8 meters long - were
larger than the bomb bay could accommodate part of the fuselage had to be
cut away, and the bomb bay doors removed. The bomb was partially recessed in
the plane, but not enclosed, with over half of it protruding in flight. A
deployed version of a Tsar Bomba carrier would of course had a bulging bomb
bay enclosure added, but this would have further reduced range from the
drag.

> 2) I should think doctrine on the possible use of nuclear weapons took
> a serious hit when a real sober look was taken of the two nuclear
> accidents the USSR experienced - Chelyabinsk and Chernobyl. The USSR
> never ever achieved the capability to feed all its people from its own
> resources and what fallout from numerous nuclear weapons would do to
> the arable lands of the Ukraine really doesn't bear thinking about.

The U.S. similarly vulnerable to this effect from the eastward fallout
plumes of strikes on the Montana and Wyoming missile fields.

In Stalin's day of course he would have grown radioactive wheat and fed it
to the population. It would have saved them from starvation and immediate
death, but given them a lifespan much reduced from normal.

> 3) FWIW I spent those Cold War years in Air Defense Command as an 86D,
> 102 and 104 pilot on active air defense alert, usually every third
> day, from 1954 through 1967, when I went to TAC and the F4. One got a
> real serious attitude about the Air Defense mission back then.

And this would not have helped those Tu-95s at all.

Carey Sublette

(Tom Adams) wrote in message >...
> "james_anatidae" > wrote in message >...
> > I was wondering at about what point that the United States going to war with
> > the Soviet Union become an almost certain act of mutual destruction. I'm
> > assuming it sometime in 1960's or 70's, since what I've seen of the Soviet
> > nuclear capability before that point doesn't seem to be all that
> > threatening. It looks like they would have been really bad for us
> > Americans, but not unsurvivable.
>
> I think October 23, 1961 is a watershed date. That is the day that
> the Soviet Union exploded the Tsar Bomba, the largest bomb ever
> exploded.
>
> Note that the yield of this bomb did not represent the technical limit
> on the yield of a hydrogen bomb. It is my understanding that there is
> no known limit. Instead, the Tsar Bomba represents a kind of
> political limit in a historical context. After the Tsar Bomba, the
> politicians on both side put on the brakes.

It was possible to create a threat to kill everyone in the US or the
USSR almost instantly (on a clear day, anyway) between 1962 and 1965,
by deploying space-based high-yield orbiting hydrogen bombs.

But no such threat was ever developed. I am not sure what
considerations prevented the development of such a threat.

Much later, the "Nuclear Winter" concept was developed and there was
concern about survivability related to that.

In article >,
Peter Skelton > writes:
> On 24 Feb 2004 21:50:10 -0800, (WaltBJ)
> wrote:
>
>>2) I should think doctrine on the possible use of nuclear weapons took
>>a serious hit when a real sober look was taken of the two nuclear
>>accidents the USSR experienced - Chelyabinsk and Chernobyl. The USSR
>>never ever achieved the capability to feed all its people from its own
>>resources and what fallout from numerous nuclear weapons would do to
>>the arable lands of the Ukraine really doesn't bear thinking about.
>>
> The doctrine was gone by 1975. What we saw after that was
> think-tank blather about the possibility of nuclear war without
> escallation. Examples: on our side the potential use of
> battlefield weapons in Europe (we'd had them earlier and
> withdrawn all except tactical nukes on figfhter-bombers, IIRC) on
> theirs taking out naval assets (they went for really big ASMs
> instead or after).

Uhm - _that_ didn't happen until 1990-91, with the adoption of the
Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. Europe, on both sidea of the
East/West divide, all through the '60s, '60s, and '80s was a forest of
nuclear warheads and delivery systems. In addition to the airplane
delivered weapons, there were, througn most of the '60s, a huge number
of Mace (TM-61) Cruise missiles. There were scade of short range
ballistic missiles, originally Redstones & Corporals, then Pershing &
Sergeants, and, finally, Pershings & Pershing IIs, and Lances.
Ballistic That doesn't count the battlefield systems like the Honest
John Rockets and AFAPs (Artillery Fired Atomic Projectiles).
Most of these systems, on the NATO side, were developed in the U.S.,
but the French had also developed theirs. (MSBS, SSBS, and Pluton).
In the case of systems fieldsd by NATO partners, (With the exception
of the wholly autonomous French systems, and hte Brits), the warheads
were held in a Dual Custody arrangement, as U.S. owned and secured
weapons, where their release required the agreement of the
U.S. Nactional Command Authority (Warhead), and the Host nation;s
Government (delivery System). If things had turned nasty before the
Iron Curtain fell, there would have been Germans, Belgians, Dutch,
Italians, Turks, and Greeks all firing off nukes.

The Warsaw Pact side had similar systems, and similar command
arrangements.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

"Peter Skelton" > wrote in message
...
> On 24 Feb 2004 21:50:10 -0800, (WaltBJ)
> wrote:
>
> >2) I should think doctrine on the possible use of nuclear weapons took
> >a serious hit when a real sober look was taken of the two nuclear
> >accidents the USSR experienced - Chelyabinsk and Chernobyl. The USSR
> >never ever achieved the capability to feed all its people from its own
> >resources and what fallout from numerous nuclear weapons would do to
> >the arable lands of the Ukraine really doesn't bear thinking about.
> >
> The doctrine was gone by 1975. What we saw after that was
> think-tank blather about the possibility of nuclear war without
> escallation. Examples: on our side the potential use of
> battlefield weapons in Europe (we'd had them earlier and
> withdrawn all except tactical nukes on figfhter-bombers, IIRC)

Actually, in 1975 we had a rather complete tactical nuclear arsenal in place
beyond those carried on the aircraft. Included were nuclear rounds for both
155mm and 8 inch artillery, Lance and Pershing I SSM's, and the atomic
demolitions muntions (SADM and MADM). The drawdown of these Army controlled
nuclear warheads did not take place until beginning in the mid eighties
(SADM and MADM) through the later eighties and into the very early nineties
(when the arty and missile warheads were returned to the US and removed from
the active stockpile). Additionaly, in 1975 I believe we also hstill had
some dual control warhead still in Europe (i.e., for older Honest John SSM's
still in use by allied nations, and possibly a few warheads for the Nike
Hercules batteries that remained in both US and allied service at that
time).

Brooks

on
> theirs taking out naval assets (they went for really big ASMs
> instead or after).
>
> >
>
> Peter Skelton

In article >,
(Tom Adams) writes:
> (Tom Adams) wrote in message >...
>> "james_anatidae" > wrote in message >...
>> > I was wondering at about what point that the United States going to war with
>> > the Soviet Union become an almost certain act of mutual destruction. I'm
>> > assuming it sometime in 1960's or 70's, since what I've seen of the Soviet
>> > nuclear capability before that point doesn't seem to be all that
>> > threatening. It looks like they would have been really bad for us
>> > Americans, but not unsurvivable.
>>
>> I think October 23, 1961 is a watershed date. That is the day that
>> the Soviet Union exploded the Tsar Bomba, the largest bomb ever
>> exploded.
>>
>> Note that the yield of this bomb did not represent the technical limit
>> on the yield of a hydrogen bomb. It is my understanding that there is
>> no known limit. Instead, the Tsar Bomba represents a kind of
>> political limit in a historical context. After the Tsar Bomba, the
>> politicians on both side put on the brakes.
>
> It was possible to create a threat to kill everyone in the US or the
> USSR almost instantly (on a clear day, anyway) between 1962 and 1965,
> by deploying space-based high-yield orbiting hydrogen bombs.
>
> But no such threat was ever developed. I am not sure what
> considerations prevented the development of such a threat.

Size and Weight. Nobody was capable of putting a 30-40 ton warhead of
that size at those heights. Well, that, and atmospheric attenuation -
all the prompt stuff, and the heat, gets absobed pretty quickly by the
Atmosphere, and there'd be no fallout. There would, if you chose the
right height, be pretty severe EMP effects, but you don't need a
whopping huge bomb for that.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

On Wed, 25 Feb 2004 09:00:42 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
> wrote:

>
>"Peter Skelton" > wrote in message
...
>> On 24 Feb 2004 21:50:10 -0800, (WaltBJ)
>> wrote:
>>
>> >2) I should think doctrine on the possible use of nuclear weapons took
>> >a serious hit when a real sober look was taken of the two nuclear
>> >accidents the USSR experienced - Chelyabinsk and Chernobyl. The USSR
>> >never ever achieved the capability to feed all its people from its own
>> >resources and what fallout from numerous nuclear weapons would do to
>> >the arable lands of the Ukraine really doesn't bear thinking about.
>> >
>> The doctrine was gone by 1975. What we saw after that was
>> think-tank blather about the possibility of nuclear war without
>> escallation. Examples: on our side the potential use of
>> battlefield weapons in Europe (we'd had them earlier and
>> withdrawn all except tactical nukes on figfhter-bombers, IIRC)
>
>Actually, in 1975 we had a rather complete tactical nuclear arsenal in place
>beyond those carried on the aircraft. Included were nuclear rounds for both
>155mm and 8 inch artillery, Lance and Pershing I SSM's, and the atomic
>demolitions muntions (SADM and MADM).

I wouldn't have thought of Pershing as battlefield, but it was
defintiely there as were the others.

The drawdown of these Army controlled
>nuclear warheads did not take place until beginning in the mid eighties
>(SADM and MADM) through the later eighties and into the very early nineties
>(when the arty and missile warheads were returned to the US and removed from
>the active stockpile).

Was this still in Europe? Its imminent absence was part of the
justification for nuclear armament of our F104's. What you're
saying is that the battlefield weapons stayed in Europe past the
fall of the Wall.

Additionaly, in 1975 I believe we also hstill had
>some dual control warhead still in Europe (i.e., for older Honest John SSM's
>still in use by allied nations, and possibly a few warheads for the Nike
>Hercules batteries that remained in both US and allied service at that
>time).
>
Honest Johns lasted into the nineties.


>
>on
>> theirs taking out naval assets (they went for really big ASMs
>> instead or after).
>>
>> >
>>
>> Peter Skelton
>


Peter Skelton

"Carey Sublette" > wrote:

:In Stalin's day of course he would have grown radioactive wheat and fed it
:to the population.

Note that this is what they are doing right now with produce from the
Chernobyl area.

:It would have saved them from starvation and immediate
:death, but given them a lifespan much reduced from normal.

People grossly overestimate the effects of radiation. Not so much
reduced at all. A few years lower on average, at most.

--
"Rule Number One for Slayers - Don't die."
-- Buffy, the Vampire Slayer

On Wed, 25 Feb 2004 14:23:54 GMT, Fred J. McCall
> wrote:

>"Carey Sublette" > wrote:
>
>:In Stalin's day of course he would have grown radioactive wheat and fed it
>:to the population.
>
>Note that this is what they are doing right now with produce from the
>Chernobyl area.
>
>:It would have saved them from starvation and immediate
>:death, but given them a lifespan much reduced from normal.
>
>People grossly overestimate the effects of radiation. Not so much
>reduced at all. A few years lower on average, at most.

If you think of infant mortality (before 2) in the 30% range as
normal life span,

If you think of a fifteen year decline in life expectancy as a
few years,

If you think of . . . .

Oh what's the point.



Peter Skelton

"Peter Skelton" > wrote in message
...
> On Wed, 25 Feb 2004 09:00:42 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Peter Skelton" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> On 24 Feb 2004 21:50:10 -0800, (WaltBJ)
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >> >2) I should think doctrine on the possible use of nuclear weapons took
> >> >a serious hit when a real sober look was taken of the two nuclear
> >> >accidents the USSR experienced - Chelyabinsk and Chernobyl. The USSR
> >> >never ever achieved the capability to feed all its people from its own
> >> >resources and what fallout from numerous nuclear weapons would do to
> >> >the arable lands of the Ukraine really doesn't bear thinking about.
> >> >
> >> The doctrine was gone by 1975. What we saw after that was
> >> think-tank blather about the possibility of nuclear war without
> >> escallation. Examples: on our side the potential use of
> >> battlefield weapons in Europe (we'd had them earlier and
> >> withdrawn all except tactical nukes on figfhter-bombers, IIRC)
> >
> >Actually, in 1975 we had a rather complete tactical nuclear arsenal in
place
> >beyond those carried on the aircraft. Included were nuclear rounds for
both
> >155mm and 8 inch artillery, Lance and Pershing I SSM's, and the atomic
> >demolitions muntions (SADM and MADM).
>
> I wouldn't have thought of Pershing as battlefield, but it was
> defintiely there as were the others.

The Pershing I did not have the range of the later Pershing II. While it was
not going to be used against targets along the FLOT, it was going to be used
in the interdiction role and against C4/logistics/transportation targets
within the theater army area of responsibility.

>
> The drawdown of these Army controlled
> >nuclear warheads did not take place until beginning in the mid eighties
> >(SADM and MADM) through the later eighties and into the very early
nineties
> >(when the arty and missile warheads were returned to the US and removed
from
> >the active stockpile).
>
> Was this still in Europe? Its imminent absence was part of the
> justification for nuclear armament of our F104's. What you're
> saying is that the battlefield weapons stayed in Europe past the
> fall of the Wall.

Not all. SADM and MADM had been withdrawn a little bit earlier in the
eighties (my last active duty company CO had just returned from a three year
tour with the ADM company in Vincenza, Italy). The writing had been on the
wall since at least 1985, when the Engineer School finally stopped making
its new LT's spend a couple of days in a secure compound at Belvoir learning
the very basics of ADM employment and planning. But the arty rounds did not
return stateside until about the same time, or shortly after, the Wall came
down. The last ones were withdrawn from the stockpile in 1992 according to
the Nuclear Weapons Archive. The Pershing II and GLCM were of course
governed by the theater nuclear forces treaty (1988 IIRC); not sure about
the arty rounds being covered by that treaty (would have been hard to
verify).

>
> Additionaly, in 1975 I believe we also hstill had
> >some dual control warhead still in Europe (i.e., for older Honest John
SSM's
> >still in use by allied nations, and possibly a few warheads for the Nike
> >Hercules batteries that remained in both US and allied service at that
> >time).
> >
> Honest Johns lasted into the nineties.

Yep. But I believe the nuclear warheads for them had been withdrawn prior to
their final retirement by allied nations.

Brooks

>
>
> >
> >on
> >> theirs taking out naval assets (they went for really big ASMs
> >> instead or after).
> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >> Peter Skelton
> >
>
>
> Peter Skelton

"bw" > wrote in message >...
> "George Z. Bush" > wrote in message
> ...
> > Dave Holford wrote:
> > > "George Z. Bush" wrote:
> > >
> > >> AIR, the "dew line" was established to give us 20 minutes notice of
> inbound
> > >> Soviet missiles, wasn't it? If so, I think the actual time when MAD
> became
> > >> our joint policies would have been in the middle fifties, or perhaps even
> a
> > >> little bit earlier, to coincide with our government having learned that
> the
> > >> Soviets had stolen our nuclear secrets and were acting on them.
> > >>
> > >> George Z.
> > >
> > >
> > > The DEW line was for air-breathers (bombers in those days) now replaced
> > > by North Warning.
> > >
> > > BMEWS (Ballistic Missile Warning System) was the missile warning system
> > > based in Alaska, Greenland and the U.K.
> >
> > Picky! Picky! So when did BMEWS become operational? We're trying to figure
> out
> > when MAD became the joint policies of the US and the USSR. You got any
> input?
> >
> > George Z.
>
> MAD was never a "joint policy" at any time. The idea of MAD goes back a long
> way in war planning. It was derived from the game theory guys at the war
> colleges. The pentagon generals gave it attention in the years after Sputnik.
> I think LeMay was an early advocate. Exactly when it was adopted by the
> politicians is unknown but it was in effect before it was publicly
> ackowledged by McNamara. If the Martians attacked, it would be put into
> effect.

MAD was covered in Kahn's "On Thermonuclear War" published in 1961.
It must have been extensively studied before that. It was probably a
forward-looking strategy in the 1950s anticipating the development of
a Soviet nuclear force.

It was certainly in the US popular mind in the early 1960s. "Dr
Stangelove" in 1964, personal fallout shelters, all that.

Kahn's book had lots of ideas, but MAD proved popular. Kahn proposed
a much more extensive system of bomb shelters and fallout shelters,
but the US politicians did not spring for that one. Kahn proposed all
sorts of limited nuclear war senarios and anti-escalation techniques,
but limited nuclear war was a unsettling idea to the populace.

Kahn thought total nuclear war could be made horrible enough to cause
significant deterrence of the first-striker, but not suicidal.
However, post total-war planning would not be a good thing for
politicians to talk about since it would upset the public.

In a way MAD was kind of soothing to the populace compared with other
aspects of nuclear war strategy, so that is probably why it got some
public promotion.

A bit of smoke and mirrors. Lots of policies, but few were fit for
public consumption. Kahn is interesting in that he aired them without
respect to their political impact.

"Carey Sublette" > writes:

>The fundamental reason why 'Ivan', the Tsar Bomba, had no relevance to the
>strategic balance was that it was undeliverable against the U.S. The weight
>of this bomb - 27 tonnes - was nearly equal to the Tu-95's maximum payload,
>and two and a half times its normal weapon load. Range of the Tu-95 was
>already marginal for attacking the U.S. even with a normal bomb load. Even
>worse, since the bomb's dimensions - 2 meters wide and 8 meters long - were
>larger than the bomb bay could accommodate part of the fuselage had to be
>cut away, and the bomb bay doors removed. The bomb was partially recessed in
>the plane, but not enclosed, with over half of it protruding in flight. A
>deployed version of a Tsar Bomba carrier would of course had a bulging bomb
>bay enclosure added, but this would have further reduced range from the
>drag.


Wouldn't a deployed Tsar Bomba carrier have been a militarized Proton,
aka UR-500 aka 8K82? The space launch version uses only storable
propellants, can put twenty tons into low orbit with the smallest
fairing easily holding a 2 x 8 meter payload, and my references on
the space launch side claim that it was developed with the ICBM role
and the Tsar Bomba payload in mind from the start (1961).

Which was a stupid idea from the start, and so never implemented,
but rather less stupid than trying to send an overladen Bear across
the arctic.


--
*John Schilling * "Anything worth doing, *
*Member:AIAA,NRA,ACLU,SAS,LP * is worth doing for money" *
*Chief Scientist & General Partner * -13th Rule of Acquisition *
*White Elephant Research, LLC * "There is no substitute *
* for success" *
*661-951-9107 or 661-275-6795 * -58th Rule of Acquisition *

"Carey Sublette" > wrote in message
ink.net...
>
> "WaltBJ" > wrote in message
> om...
> > Comments:
> > 1) It is true that there is no theoretical limit to the size of a TNW.
> > The practical limit is when the bomb vents to space rather than
> > expanding across the surface of the earth. Big bombs are impractical
> > since they blow the hell out of the hypocenter (spot directly under
> > the bomb) but the radius of destruction increases as the cube root of
> > the bomb's yield. One could take the same amount of critical material
> > and make numerous smaller bombs and achieve a much greater area of
> > destruction by carefully distributing them over the target zone.
>
> The fundamental reason why 'Ivan', the Tsar Bomba, had no relevance to the
> strategic balance was that it was undeliverable against the U.S. The
weight
> of this bomb - 27 tonnes - was nearly equal to the Tu-95's maximum
payload,
> and two and a half times its normal weapon load. Range of the Tu-95 was
> already marginal for attacking the U.S. even with a normal bomb load. Even
> worse, since the bomb's dimensions - 2 meters wide and 8 meters long -
were
> larger than the bomb bay could accommodate part of the fuselage had to be
> cut away, and the bomb bay doors removed. The bomb was partially recessed
in
> the plane, but not enclosed, with over half of it protruding in flight. A
> deployed version of a Tsar Bomba carrier would of course had a bulging
bomb
> bay enclosure added, but this would have further reduced range from the
> drag.
>
> > 2) I should think doctrine on the possible use of nuclear weapons took
> > a serious hit when a real sober look was taken of the two nuclear
> > accidents the USSR experienced - Chelyabinsk and Chernobyl. The USSR
> > never ever achieved the capability to feed all its people from its own
> > resources and what fallout from numerous nuclear weapons would do to
> > the arable lands of the Ukraine really doesn't bear thinking about.
>
> The U.S. similarly vulnerable to this effect from the eastward fallout
> plumes of strikes on the Montana and Wyoming missile fields.
>
What the heck! Back in the '50s you could buy tickets and go
sit in abandoned uranium mines in Montana and elsewhere.
It was supposed to help cure 'What ails you.'
You could also put your feet in a special box in the shoe store
and watch your toes wiggle. ...let you know how the new shoes fit.
Wish I had one now to check out a broken little toe in my rt. foot.
No pain and no handicap but not worth the doctors big fee.

> In Stalin's day of course he would have grown radioactive wheat and fed it
> to the population. It would have saved them from starvation and immediate
> death, but given them a lifespan much reduced from normal.
>
In ten years or so, we may say the same about the Atkins diet. :)

> > 3) FWIW I spent those Cold War years in Air Defense Command as an 86D,
> > 102 and 104 pilot on active air defense alert, usually every third
> > day, from 1954 through 1967, when I went to TAC and the F4. One got a
> > real serious attitude about the Air Defense mission back then.
>
> And this would not have helped those Tu-95s at all.
>
> Carey Sublette
>
>

On 25 Feb 2004 08:31:03 -0800, (John Schilling)
wrote:


>Wouldn't a deployed Tsar Bomba carrier have been a militarized Proton,
>aka UR-500 aka 8K82? The space launch version uses only storable
>propellants, can put twenty tons into low orbit with the smallest
>fairing easily holding a 2 x 8 meter payload, and my references on
>the space launch side claim that it was developed with the ICBM role
>and the Tsar Bomba payload in mind from the start (1961).
>



The airburst footprint of 100MT delivered that way would indeed be scary.
Hadnt realised that an ICBM was a viable delivery platform for it.




greg

--
You do a lot less thundering in the pulpit against the Harlot
after she marches right down the aisle and kicks you in the nuts.

In article et>,
"Carey Sublette" > wrote:

> "WaltBJ" > wrote in message
> om...
> > Comments:
> > 1) It is true that there is no theoretical limit to the size of a TNW.
> > The practical limit is when the bomb vents to space rather than
> > expanding across the surface of the earth. Big bombs are impractical
> > since they blow the hell out of the hypocenter (spot directly under
> > the bomb) but the radius of destruction increases as the cube root of
> > the bomb's yield. One could take the same amount of critical material
> > and make numerous smaller bombs and achieve a much greater area of
> > destruction by carefully distributing them over the target zone.
>
> The fundamental reason why 'Ivan', the Tsar Bomba, had no relevance to
> the
> strategic balance was that it was undeliverable against the U.S. The
> weight
> of this bomb - 27 tonnes - was nearly equal to the Tu-95's maximum
> payload,
> and two and a half times its normal weapon load. Range of the Tu-95 was
> already marginal for attacking the U.S. even with a normal bomb load.
> Even
> worse, since the bomb's dimensions - 2 meters wide and 8 meters long -
> were
> larger than the bomb bay could accommodate part of the fuselage had to be
> cut away, and the bomb bay doors removed. The bomb was partially recessed
> in
> the plane, but not enclosed, with over half of it protruding in flight. A
> deployed version of a Tsar Bomba carrier would of course had a bulging
> bomb
> bay enclosure added, but this would have further reduced range from the
> drag.


Clearly, it was unsuitable as an aircraft-delivered weapon. While I
tend to think the motivations were propaganda and perhaps some
technologists gone wild, I would not, however, dismiss it is unusable.
Impractical and fraught with risks? Of course.

Ship or submarine delivery systems, probably sacrificing the delivery
platform, certainly wouldn't have the same restrictions on cubage and
weight. Would we have been as alert then to a third-country tramp
steamer?

Conceivably, there might be some prepositioned ground options, perhaps
in Germany, as an ultimate deterrent against a NATO counterstrike.

Even nastier would be placement on seabeds.

Peter Skelton > wrote in message >...
>>
> MacNamarra stated in his book that the US was deterred from a
> strike by the Soviets 550 warheads in 1962 (Cuban crisis), so MAD
> was operating at that time, although not named yet. If he is not
> correct, the 1963 test ban treaty is further evidence that the
> situation was recognized.
>
>

I would say that MacNamara, as usual, is not correct. In 1962 the
decision-makers in the West (UK-USA) knew from Oleg Penkovsky that the
Soviet Union had only 10 or so ICBMs and they would take 10-12 hours
to get ready for launch. The Soviet documents from the period under
discussion remain inaccessible to historians and create gaps that can
only be filled in with conjecture. Even the reasons for the Cuban
missile gambit are very clouded.

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/CWIHP/BULLETINS/b4a11.htm
Soviet Cold War Military Strategy: Using Declassified History

By William Burr

"The history of the Soviet strategic program is at the same time a
history of U.S. perceptions."1 So wrote a team of historians and
political scientists in a once highly classified Pentagon history of
the
Cold War strategic arms race. The authors were describing an
important problem: so long as primary sources were unavailable,
academic and government analysts interested in explaining Soviet
military policy had to resort to "inferences drawn by long chains of
logic" to interpret the scattered data available to them.2 And to a
great extent, that data, whether leaked/declassified or not, had been
filtered through the U.S. intelligence system. Under those
circumstances, interpretive efforts were always constrained; the
relative opacity of Soviet defense policymaking made it difficult to
ascertain, much less evaluate, the relevant "facts." This made it
easy for analysts to fall back on Cold War ideology and habits such
as "mirror imaging," which could easily lead to misunderstanding.
Thus, educated guesswork and perceptions alone, severed from the
deeper understanding that primary sources can provide, shaped the
American public's understanding of Soviet military decision-
making, policies, and programs for the entire Cold War period.

<more>

(Peter Stickney) wrote in message >...
> In article >,
> "George Z. Bush" > writes:
> > Peter Stickney wrote:
>
> >> BMEWS was the response to the threat of ICBMs coming over the Pole.
> >> But, in some ways, we were still further along than the Soviets wer in
> >> building and deploying useful ICBMs and SLBMs. Kruschev was great at
> >> showing off spactacular feats of missilery, and veiled, and not so
> >> veiled threats to use his missiles, but that wasn't backed up by what
> >> was in the field. Consider, if you will, that if the Soviets had had
> >> a viable ICBM or SLBM force in 1962, they wouldn't have tried putting
> >> the short-range missiles in Cuba. That whole business grew out of the
> >> Soviet's knowledge that they couldn't effectively strike. (Either First
> >> Strike or Second Strike)
> >
> > That was all very interesting, and certainly did much to refresh flagging
> > memories. However, it still didn't resolve the starting date for
> > MAD, because
> > it ignored the ongoing SAC airborne alerts and the nuclear armed subs roaming
> > the oceans. I personally have the feeling that the MAD doctrine evolved from
> > recognition of those SAC policies by the Soviets, which would place
> > the date at
> > or before construction of the DEW line.
> > All guesswork on my part. What do you think?
>
> Well, just my opinion, of course, but I think that the MAD thinking
> didn't occur until the mid '60s. It really didn't get set in stone
> until it was decided to limit the deployment of the Spartan/Safeguard
> ABM system, which occurred before the negotiation of the ABM Treaty
> which occurred in 1972. The Soviets, of course, had been trying with
> all possible strength to get systems in place to deliver their nukes
> all through the 1950s. As I pointed out before, air-breathers -
> Bombers and Cruise Missiles, weren't going to cut it, at least in our
> mutual perceptions. (Since it never got tried for real) The Soviets
> put more efforts into their ICBM projects than we did, but their
> progress wasn't as fast as they wished, so they propagandized the hell
> out of it, making themselves look much more powerful than they were,
> and hoped that we either wouldn't find out, or wouldn't call the
> bluff. (All that Missile Gap stuff in the 1960 election, for
> example.)
> So the Soviets had been trying to present a credible force for quite a
> while, but weren't really there.
>
> All through the 1950s, the Soviets didn't have any confidence in their
> ability to put bombs on target, The idea of MAD, which is more a
> Western conceit, rather than a bilateral policy, didn't come about
> until the Soviets had a significant and reliable ICBM force. This
> didn't happen until the mid '60s, at best, with their development of
> storable-fuel ICBMs, and the Yankee Class Ballistic Missile Subs.
> That feeling of inferiority, after all, was what drove Kruschev to try
> to put the short and medium range missiles in Cuba in 1962. They knew
> that they were going to come off second best against what we had, and
> counted on holding the initialtive and being agressive to make the
> differnece. It didn't work that way, and that's the main reason why
> Khruschev was chucked out - he scared the Supreme Soviet more than he
> scared us. (And mind you, he was plenty scarey)
>
> There's no definite indication tha the Soviet Heirarchy ever really
> bought into the idea of MAD. The Soviets, don't forget, were perfectly
> willing to trade vast numbers of their population for their system's
> survival. The communization of the Ukraine, and the scorched-earch
> strategies used in WW 2 are ample examples of that.
>
> But then, this is one of those things that is really a matter of
> trying to nail Jello to the wall - since it was never a stated,
> formal, policy, but more an attitude and set of perceptions.

http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol09/91/91krep.pdf which argues MAD came
about after the various treaties had established offensive missiles
but prohibited defensive missiles. Everyone tries to put a date on MAD
but I would argue that once Herman Kahn starting having his little
briefings on winning thermonuclear war the idea was fertilized and the
gestation period a matter of how you determine whether an idea is born
in the brain or on paper.

and
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutual_Assured_Destruction
Mutual assured destruction
(Redirected from Mutual Assured Destruction)

Mutual assured destruction (MAD) is the doctrine of a situation in
which any use of nuclear weapons by either of two opposing sides would
result in the destruction of both the attacker and the defender. The
doctrine assumes that each side has enough weaponry to destroy the
other side and that either side, if attacked for any reason by the
other, would retaliate with equal or greater force. The expected
result is that the battle would escalate to the point where each side
brought about the other's total and assured destruction - and,
potentially, those of allies as well.

Assuming that neither side would be so irrational as to risk its own
destruction, neither side would dare to launch a first strike as the
other would launch on warning (also called fail deadly). The payoff of
this doctrine was expected to be tense but stable peace.

The primary application of this doctrine occurred during the Cold War
(1950s to 1990s) between the United States and Soviet Union, in which
MAD was seen as helping to prevent any direct full-scale conflicts
between the two nations while they engaged in smaller proxy wars
around the world. MAD was part of U.S. strategic doctrine which
believed that nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the United
States could best be prevented if neither side could defend itself
against the other's nuclear missiles (see Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty). The credibility of the threat being critical to such
assurance, each side had to invest substantial capital in weapons,
even those not intended for use.

This MAD scenario was often known by the less frightening euphemism
"nuclear deterrence".

Critics of the MAD doctrine noted that the acronym MAD fits the word
mad (meaning insane) because it depended on several challengable
assumptions:

Perfect detection
No false positives in the equipment and/or procedures that must
identify a launch by the other side
No possibility of camoflaging a launch
No alternate means of delivery other than a missile (no hiding
warheads in an ice cream truck)
The weaker version of MAD also depends on perfect attribution of the
launch. (If you see a launch on the Sino-Russian border, who do you
retaliate against?) The stronger version of MAD does not depend on
attribution. (If someone launches at you, end the world.)
Perfect rationality
No rogue states will develop nuclear weapons (or, if they do, they
will stop behaving as rogue states and start to subject themselves to
the logic of MAD)
No rogue commanders on either side at any time with the ability to
corrupt the launch decision process
All leaders with launch capability care about the survival of their
subjects
While MAD does not depend on the assumption that the retaliatory
launch system will work perfectly, it does depend on the challengable
assumption that no leader with launch capability would strike first
and gamble that the opponent's response system would fail
Inability to defend
No shelters sufficient to protect population and/or industry
No development of anti-missile technology or deployment of remedial
protective gear
The doctrine was satirized in the 1964 film Dr. Strangelove or: How I
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb. In the film, the Soviets
have a doomsday machine which automatically detects any nuclear attack
on the Soviet Union, whereupon it destroys all life on earth by
fallout. The film also has the rogue commander who (ignorant of the
Russian doomsday machine) orders his wing on a (preemtive) nuclear
strike, betting that the high command has to back him by launching all
their nuclear arsenal to survive the Russian counterattack. The film
mirrored life in that the nuclear strategist Herman Kahn had actually
contemplated such a machine as one strategy in ensuring mutual assured
destruction. In fact, the film represents an interesting phenomenon
explored by certain theorists: contrary to the assumptions of MAD, a
threat fulfilling strategy --in which one promises to act on one's
threats, regardless of the rationality of doing so-- could be used by
one side to subdue the other. To have a chance of working, however,
the strategy must be known by the enemy --a condition that is not
satisfied in Kubrick's film. It is not entirely clear, though, whether
adopting such a risky strategy can be classified as a a rational act
at all.

The fall of the Soviet Union has reduced tensions between Russia and
the United States and between the United States and China. MAD has
been replaced as a model for stability between Russia and the United
States as well as between the United States and China. Although the
administration of George W. Bush has abrogated the anti-ballistic
missile treaty, the limited national missile defense system proposed
by the Bush administration is designed to prevent nuclear blackmail by
a state with limited nuclear capability and is not planned to alter
the nuclear posture between Russia and the United States. MAD's
replacement (asymmetric warfare) is designed to take advantage of
years of analysis that focussed on finding a concept for stability
that did not rely on holding civilian populations hostage.

The Bush administration has approached Russia with the idea of moving
away from MAD to a different nuclear policy of total weaponry
escalation. Russia has thus far been rather unreceptive to these
approaches largely out of fear that a different defense posture would
be more advantageous to the United States than to Russia.

Some argue that MAD was abandoned on 25 July 1980 when US President
Jimmy Carter adopted the countervailing strategy in Presidential
Directive 59. From this date onwards US policy was to win a nuclear
war. The planned response to a Soviet attack was no longer to bomb
Russian cities and assure their destruction. American nuclear weapons
were first to kill the Soviet leadership, then attack military
targets, in the hope of a Russian surrender before total destruction
of the USSR (and the USA). This policy was further developed by
President Ronald Reagan with the announcement of the Strategic Defense
Initiative (aka Star Wars), aimed at destroying Russian missiles
before they reached the US. If SDI had been operational it would have
undermined the "assured destruction" required for MAD.

The Bush administration also proposed the use of small nuclear weapons
to be used against terrorists in caves. The implication was that
nobody would militarily object to this preemptive usage of nuclear
weapons, as the US was the only superpower with both nuclear weapons
and strong world policy ambitions.

"Jim Knoyle" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Carey Sublette" > wrote in message
> ink.net...
> >
> > "WaltBJ" > wrote in message
> > om...
> > > Comments:
> > > 1) It is true that there is no theoretical limit to the size of a TNW.
> > > The practical limit is when the bomb vents to space rather than
> > > expanding across the surface of the earth. Big bombs are impractical
> > > since they blow the hell out of the hypocenter (spot directly under
> > > the bomb) but the radius of destruction increases as the cube root of
> > > the bomb's yield. One could take the same amount of critical material
> > > and make numerous smaller bombs and achieve a much greater area of
> > > destruction by carefully distributing them over the target zone.
> >
> > The fundamental reason why 'Ivan', the Tsar Bomba, had no relevance to
the
> > strategic balance was that it was undeliverable against the U.S. The
> weight
> > of this bomb - 27 tonnes - was nearly equal to the Tu-95's maximum
> payload,
> > and two and a half times its normal weapon load. Range of the Tu-95 was
> > already marginal for attacking the U.S. even with a normal bomb load.
Even
> > worse, since the bomb's dimensions - 2 meters wide and 8 meters long -
> were
> > larger than the bomb bay could accommodate part of the fuselage had to
be
> > cut away, and the bomb bay doors removed. The bomb was partially
recessed
> in
> > the plane, but not enclosed, with over half of it protruding in flight.
A
> > deployed version of a Tsar Bomba carrier would of course had a bulging
> bomb
> > bay enclosure added, but this would have further reduced range from the
> > drag.
> >
> > > 2) I should think doctrine on the possible use of nuclear weapons
took
> > > a serious hit when a real sober look was taken of the two nuclear
> > > accidents the USSR experienced - Chelyabinsk and Chernobyl. The USSR
> > > never ever achieved the capability to feed all its people from its own
> > > resources and what fallout from numerous nuclear weapons would do to
> > > the arable lands of the Ukraine really doesn't bear thinking about.
> >
> > The U.S. similarly vulnerable to this effect from the eastward fallout
> > plumes of strikes on the Montana and Wyoming missile fields.
> >
> What the heck! Back in the '50s you could buy tickets and go
> sit in abandoned uranium mines in Montana and elsewhere.
> It was supposed to help cure 'What ails you.'
<snip>

There still there, but now its the radon doing the curing:

http://cnts.wpi.edu/RSH/Docs/Radon/Index_RadSpas.htm

http://www.outwestnewspaper.com/radon.html

I guess suckers are still being born every minute.

Joe


> > Carey Sublette
> >
> >
>
>




-----= Posted via Newsfeeds.Com, Uncensored Usenet News =-----
http://www.newsfeeds.com - The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World!
-----== Over 100,000 Newsgroups - 19 Different Servers! =-----

Jack Linthicum muttered....

> Peter Skelton > wrote in message
> >...
>>>
>> MacNamarra stated in his book that the US was deterred from a
>> strike by the Soviets 550 warheads in 1962 (Cuban crisis), so MAD
>> was operating at that time, although not named yet. If he is not
>> correct, the 1963 test ban treaty is further evidence that the
>> situation was recognized.
>>
>>
>
> I would say that MacNamara, as usual, is not correct. In 1962 the
> decision-makers in the West (UK-USA) knew from Oleg Penkovsky that the
> Soviet Union had only 10 or so ICBMs and they would take 10-12 hours
> to get ready for launch. The Soviet documents from the period under
> discussion remain inaccessible to historians and create gaps that can
> only be filled in with conjecture. Even the reasons for the Cuban
> missile gambit are very clouded.
>

At the same moment US INTEL, US Political (and Western European and the
NATO "consensus") opinions were clouded (and the four often quite
different, 4 conclusions from 4 perspectives), what the Soviet
"leasdership" actually "thought" and upon which factors they might base
actions and reactions remained equally if not more clouded. Nor was the
machinery within the Soviet organs of the state and the military near so
monolithic as we all would have liked to conclude (since it made
predictions so much easier and justifiable).

On "our" side, junior, company and field grade officers and low level
commanders tended to view the various Soviet weapons systems as far less
well developed and potentially effective than they seemed to be viewed at
the highest military and political levels, leading many of us to believe
that some exaggeration was employed at those levels to justify policy and
war plans.

Obviously, the modern parallel may be found as relates to the WMD
issue...that the risk in "denying" their potential existence may have
seemed so great that to do so seemed unwise.

Meanwhile, a "re-look" at the Soviet policy during the period signals that
the Soviet leaders were misled by their own military who, in a traditional
(for militaries and their suppliers throughout history) panegyric oversold
systems and capabilities to an even greater extent than we in the West did.

Perhaps, in the final analysis, better that both sides over-rated the other
and at the same time were over-sold as to their own capabilities, thus
staying a longer step away from some almost accidental petty confrontation
screwing the pooch.

TMO

In article >,
Greg Hennessy > wrote:

> On 25 Feb 2004 08:31:03 -0800, (John Schilling)
> wrote:
>
>
> >Wouldn't a deployed Tsar Bomba carrier have been a militarized Proton,
> >aka UR-500 aka 8K82? The space launch version uses only storable
> >propellants, can put twenty tons into low orbit with the smallest
> >fairing easily holding a 2 x 8 meter payload, and my references on
> >the space launch side claim that it was developed with the ICBM role
> >and the Tsar Bomba payload in mind from the start (1961).
>
> The airburst footprint of 100MT delivered that way would indeed be scary.
> Hadnt realised that an ICBM was a viable delivery platform for it.

Weapons effects from:
<http://www.stardestroyer.net/Empire/Science/Nuke.html>

100 MT 1 MT 100 KT

77.1 km 11.7 km 4.5 km Thermal radiation radius (3rd degree burns)
33 km 7.2 km 3.4 km Air blast radius (widespread destruction)
12.5 km 2.7 km 1.3 km Air blast radius (near-total fatalities)
7.5 km 3.1 km 2.0 km Ionizing radiation radius (500 rem)
35.7 sec 4.5 sec 1.6 sec Fireball duration
2.7 km 430 m 170 m Fireball radius (minimum)
3.3 km 530 m 210 m Fireball radius (airburst)
4.4 km 700 m 280 m Fireball radius (ground-contact airburst)

Of course, with that same payload, you could put up a couple of dozen 1
MT bombs of the same vintage.

Looking at effective destruction, you only get:

100 MT 1 MT 100 KT
3421 km^2 163 km^2 64 km^2

21 times the "widespread destruction" area, for 100 times the power,
when comparing the 100 MT versus a 1 MT, and 53 times the effect for
*1000* times the power of a standard-issue 100 KT weapon.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

On 2/25/04 9:33 AM, in article
, "Tom Adams"
> wrote:

> Kahn is interesting in that he aired them without
> respect to their political impact.

Unlikely. If one gives no thought to political impact,
then why air them at all?

Perhaps you meant that he didn't care which group of
politicians were made to look the worst by his disclosures.



Jack
--------------------------------------------------
Freedom Isn't Free! See the Future in History:
bondage > faith > courage > liberty > abundance >
complacency > apathy > dependence > bondage.
--------------------------------------------------

(Jack Linthicum) wrote:

>I would say that MacNamara, as usual, is not correct.

MacNamara is busily trying to re-invent his role and his place in
history.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

In article >,
(Jack Linthicum) wrote:

> (Peter Stickney) wrote in message
> >...
> > In article >,
> > "George Z. Bush" > writes:
> > > Peter Stickney wrote:
> >

>
> http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol09/91/91krep.pdf which argues MAD came
> about after the various treaties had established offensive missiles
> but prohibited defensive missiles. Everyone tries to put a date on MAD
> but I would argue that once Herman Kahn starting having his little
> briefings on winning thermonuclear war the idea was fertilized and the
> gestation period a matter of how you determine whether an idea is born
> in the brain or on paper.


Kahn wasn't the only one talking in that period. He published _On
Thermonuclear War_ in 1961, and the popularization _Thinking about the
Unthinkable_ in 1962, and _On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios_ in
1965.

Henry Kissinger had published _Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy_ in
1957, and there were various RAND Corporation and other publications
around then. Kissinger definitely raised the possibility of nuclear
warfighting in that book, which included discussion of tactical weapons.







A collection from the period is Klaus Knorr and Thornton Read (eds)
_Limited Strategic War_

> The doctrine was satirized in the 1964 film Dr. Strangelove or: How I
> Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb. In the film, the Soviets
> have a doomsday machine which automatically detects any nuclear attack
> on the Soviet Union, whereupon it destroys all life on earth by
> fallout. The film also has the rogue commander who (ignorant of the
> Russian doomsday machine) orders his wing on a (preemtive) nuclear
> strike, betting that the high command has to back him by launching all
> their nuclear arsenal to survive the Russian counterattack. The film
> mirrored life in that the nuclear strategist Herman Kahn had actually
> contemplated such a machine as one strategy in ensuring mutual assured
> destruction.

My recollection of Kahn's discussion of a doomsday machine was as a
reductio ad absurdum -- an extreme case to make people stop and look.
After one SAC targeting briefing, he is said to have commented "You
people don't have a war plan -- you have a wargasm." Indeed, one of the
rings of his 44-step ladder in _On Escalation_ is "spasm or insensate
war."

>In fact, the film represents an interesting phenomenon
> explored by certain theorists: contrary to the assumptions of MAD, a
> threat fulfilling strategy --in which one promises to act on one's
> threats, regardless of the rationality of doing so-- could be used by
> one side to subdue the other. To have a chance of working, however,
> the strategy must be known by the enemy --a condition that is not
> satisfied in Kubrick's film. It is not entirely clear, though, whether
> adopting such a risky strategy can be classified as a a rational act
> at all.

While there are very clear psychological questions whether combatants
would keep nuclear war limited, there certainly were steps to stabilize
the environment, more in war prevention. These included the original
"hot line", and the US giving Permissive Action Link technology to the
Soviets.

> Some argue that MAD was abandoned on 25 July 1980 when US President
> Jimmy Carter adopted the countervailing strategy in Presidential
> Directive 59. From this date onwards US policy was to win a nuclear
> war.

I agree PD-59 was am extremely important document, but I wouldn't say it
specifically set a goal of victory. What it did do was create a wider
range of nuclear options, and, in particular, focused on survivable
command, control and communications during the transattack period.


>The planned response to a Soviet attack was no longer to bomb
> Russian cities and assure their destruction.

As you probably know, that wasn't the early strategy. The first plans
had three major options, A, B and R. From memory, A targeted the Soviet
"atomic" infrastructure, B "blunted" conventional forces that could
attack Western Europe, and R "retarded" the economy by going after
industrial targets.


>American nuclear weapons
> were first to kill the Soviet leadership, then attack military
> targets, in the hope of a Russian surrender before total destruction
> of the USSR (and the USA). This policy was further developed by
> President Ronald Reagan with the announcement of the Strategic Defense
> Initiative (aka Star Wars), aimed at destroying Russian missiles
> before they reached the US. If SDI had been operational it would have
> undermined the "assured destruction" required for MAD.
>
> The Bush administration also proposed the use of small nuclear weapons
> to be used against terrorists in caves. The implication was that
> nobody would militarily object to this preemptive usage of nuclear
> weapons, as the US was the only superpower with both nuclear weapons
> and strong world policy ambitions.

"Derek Lyons" > wrote in message
...
> (Jack Linthicum) wrote:
>
> >I would say that MacNamara, as usual, is not correct.
>
> MacNamara is busily trying to re-invent his role and his place in
> history.
>
I think a good description of MacNamara is that he is highly intelligent man
who was (is?) highly misguided and gives little thought to the opinions of
ours.

In article >, "james_anatidae"
> wrote:

> "Derek Lyons" > wrote in message
> ...
> > (Jack Linthicum) wrote:
> >
> > >I would say that MacNamara, as usual, is not correct.
> >
> > MacNamara is busily trying to re-invent his role and his place in
> > history.
> >
> I think a good description of MacNamara is that he is highly intelligent
> man
> who was (is?) highly misguided and gives little thought to the opinions
> of
> ours.
>
>

But how could he POSSIBLY be misguided by following his own opinions? :-)

Seriously, in the latter phases of the Johnson administration, he found
his intellectual framework, "everything could be quantified and managed
with numbers", had failed. Not to excuse him, but he was an emotional
basket case well before he resigned as SecDef, and gave even worse
advice.

I was just looking at my copy of Kissinger's _Nuclear Weapons and
Foreign Policy_ (1957), which specifically mentions finding alternatives
to MAD. So, we have evidence that MAD was clearly a theoretical concept
in the mid-fifties, giving the time lag in publishing books. From 1953
to 1956, Kissinger was study director for nuclear weapons at the Council
on Foreign Relations.

SNIP
> Size and Weight. Nobody was capable of putting a 30-40 ton warhead of
> that size at those heights. Well, that, and atmospheric attenuation -
> all the prompt stuff, and the heat, gets absobed pretty quickly by the
> Atmosphere, and there'd be no fallout. There would, if you chose the
> right height, be pretty severe EMP effects, but you don't need a
> whopping huge bomb for that.
SNIP:
No fall out? The 100 MT was achieved by wrapping a multi-ton U238
jacket about Ivan. The fast neutrons from Ivan fission the U238 and
now you have multi tons of fallout added to Ivan. This of course is
the fission-fusion-fission
bomb in mega-size. I make the fireball from 100MT about 67,000 feet in
diameter.
using known sizes and the W^1/3 relation. Walt BJ

"Fred J. McCall" > wrote in message
...
> "Carey Sublette" > wrote:
>
> :In Stalin's day of course he would have grown radioactive wheat and fed
it
> :to the population.
>
> Note that this is what they are doing right now with produce from the
> Chernobyl area.
>
> :It would have saved them from starvation and immediate
> :death, but given them a lifespan much reduced from normal.
>
> People grossly overestimate the effects of radiation. Not so much
> reduced at all. A few years lower on average, at most.

I believe you underestimate how radioactive the wheat would have been in
fields downwind from a few hundred 400 kt ground bursts. This would be
1000-10,000 times more contaminated than any from Chernobyl. Of course, by
mixing this with wheat grown elsewhere the individual exposure could be
considerably reduced b distributing over a large population (Russia and
Ukraine are doing this with Chernobyl wheat also).

In article >,
(WaltBJ) writes:
> SNIP
>> Size and Weight. Nobody was capable of putting a 30-40 ton warhead of
>> that size at those heights. Well, that, and atmospheric attenuation -
>> all the prompt stuff, and the heat, gets absobed pretty quickly by the
>> Atmosphere, and there'd be no fallout. There would, if you chose the
>> right height, be pretty severe EMP effects, but you don't need a
>> whopping huge bomb for that.
> SNIP:
> No fall out? The 100 MT was achieved by wrapping a multi-ton U238
> jacket about Ivan. The fast neutrons from Ivan fission the U238 and
> now you have multi tons of fallout added to Ivan. This of course is
> the fission-fusion-fission
> bomb in mega-size. I make the fireball from 100MT about 67,000 feet in
> diameter.
> using known sizes and the W^1/3 relation. Walt BJ

I should have said "relatively little fallout" Even with 20 tons of
vaporized casing, it's still a fairly small amount compared to the
contribution of even a moderate sized ground burst.

I was addressing Mr. Adam's contention that it was conceivable to, on
a clear day, depopulate the U.S> with a set of 100 MT burts at 100+
miles in height. That's right out - the air's too thick, for those of
us on the surface.
Not that I'd want to be sitting next to one, mind you. IIRC, Ivan
scorched the RC-135 that was monitoring the test from some presumed
safe (ANd unintercepted) distance. I wonder what happened to the
Tu-95 that dropped it?

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

"John Schilling" > wrote in message
...
> "Carey Sublette" > writes:
>
> >The fundamental reason why 'Ivan', the Tsar Bomba, had no relevance to
the
> >strategic balance was that it was undeliverable against the U.S. The
weight
> >of this bomb - 27 tonnes - was nearly equal to the Tu-95's maximum
payload,
> >and two and a half times its normal weapon load. Range of the Tu-95 was
> >already marginal for attacking the U.S. even with a normal bomb load.
Even
> >worse, since the bomb's dimensions - 2 meters wide and 8 meters long -
were
> >larger than the bomb bay could accommodate part of the fuselage had to be
> >cut away, and the bomb bay doors removed. The bomb was partially recessed
in
> >the plane, but not enclosed, with over half of it protruding in flight. A
> >deployed version of a Tsar Bomba carrier would of course had a bulging
bomb
> >bay enclosure added, but this would have further reduced range from the
> >drag.
>
>
> Wouldn't a deployed Tsar Bomba carrier have been a militarized Proton,
> aka UR-500 aka 8K82? The space launch version uses only storable
> propellants, can put twenty tons into low orbit with the smallest
> fairing easily holding a 2 x 8 meter payload, and my references on
> the space launch side claim that it was developed with the ICBM role
> and the Tsar Bomba payload in mind from the start (1961).
>
> Which was a stupid idea from the start, and so never implemented,
> but rather less stupid than trying to send an overladen Bear across
> the arctic.

The only references I recall seeing for models that were actually made were
bomb versions. They could have been used against NATO (but this has nothing
to do with MAD).

It seems likely that they investigated the Proton idea since it is the only
way to get it to America. Do you know of any attempts to develop an RV for
this? Can you give me any specific citations?

In article >,
(Jack Linthicum) writes:
> (Peter Stickney) wrote in message >...
>> In article >,
>> "George Z. Bush" > writes:

> http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol09/91/91krep.pdf which argues MAD came
> about after the various treaties had established offensive missiles
> but prohibited defensive missiles. Everyone tries to put a date on MAD
> but I would argue that once Herman Kahn starting having his little
> briefings on winning thermonuclear war the idea was fertilized and the
> gestation period a matter of how you determine whether an idea is born
> in the brain or on paper.

I've no doubt that Kahn, and, perhaps, a few others, thought up, or
bought into, the idea in the late '50s. That doesn't mean that it was
accepted, however, or, more importantly, implemented, in that era.
And it most certainly wasn't. In my opinion, the point that MAD could
be considered accepted is the point at which _both_ the U.S.A and the
U.S.S.R. decided that there wasn't any point in increasing their
strategic arsenals further. There was a sea-change for teh U.S. in
the mid '60s - The B-47s were retired without replacenment, The
cryogenically-fuelled (Well, Oxidized, really, but you know what I
mean) ICBMs were gone, the Titan II deployment was held to 54
missiles, the Minuteman deployment was complete, and teh SLBM fleet
was under way. The Soviets took a bit longer to catch up - they
didn't have any confidence in their manned bombers, and for all their
early demonstrations in the Space Race, their ICBM abilities were
poor, and their SLBM capability was worse. I'd say late '60s or so,
for them - let's fix it at the point where they were willing to
negotiate SALT I.

<Snip Wikipedia Article.> All very nice, but Wikipedia is being built
up by folks like you and me - its contents are only as rigorous as its
authors.

There were lots of wonky ideas floating around wrt what shape Global
Thermonuclear War would take. One of my favorite pieces of
foolishness was the Turtles - Giant Robotic Bomb Carriers, impervious
to al weapons, able to wade the deepest oceans, which would be
directed toward an enemy's targets to scare the into surrendering by
their slowly creeping menace.
That doesn't mean that the idea was accepted.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

(Peter Stickney) wrote in message >...
> In article >,
> (Tom Adams) writes:
> > (Tom Adams) wrote in message >...
> >> "james_anatidae" > wrote in message >...
> >> > I was wondering at about what point that the United States going to war with
> >> > the Soviet Union become an almost certain act of mutual destruction. I'm
> >> > assuming it sometime in 1960's or 70's, since what I've seen of the Soviet
> >> > nuclear capability before that point doesn't seem to be all that
> >> > threatening. It looks like they would have been really bad for us
> >> > Americans, but not unsurvivable.
> >>
> >> I think October 23, 1961 is a watershed date. That is the day that
> >> the Soviet Union exploded the Tsar Bomba, the largest bomb ever
> >> exploded.
> >>
> >> Note that the yield of this bomb did not represent the technical limit
> >> on the yield of a hydrogen bomb. It is my understanding that there is
> >> no known limit. Instead, the Tsar Bomba represents a kind of
> >> political limit in a historical context. After the Tsar Bomba, the
> >> politicians on both side put on the brakes.
> >
> > It was possible to create a threat to kill everyone in the US or the
> > USSR almost instantly (on a clear day, anyway) between 1962 and 1965,
> > by deploying space-based high-yield orbiting hydrogen bombs.
> >
> > But no such threat was ever developed. I am not sure what
> > considerations prevented the development of such a threat.
>
> Size and Weight. Nobody was capable of putting a 30-40 ton warhead of
> that size at those heights. Well, that, and atmospheric attenuation -
> all the prompt stuff, and the heat, gets absobed pretty quickly by the
> Atmosphere,

Less than half the radiant energy of the sun is absorbed.

> and there'd be no fallout. There would, if you chose the
> right height, be pretty severe EMP effects, but you don't need a
> whopping huge bomb for that.

"Peter Stickney" > wrote in message
...
> In article >,
> (WaltBJ) writes:
> > SNIP
> >> Size and Weight. Nobody was capable of putting a 30-40 ton warhead of
> >> that size at those heights. Well, that, and atmospheric attenuation -
> >> all the prompt stuff, and the heat, gets absobed pretty quickly by the
> >> Atmosphere, and there'd be no fallout. There would, if you chose the
> >> right height, be pretty severe EMP effects, but you don't need a
> >> whopping huge bomb for that.
> > SNIP:
> > No fall out? The 100 MT was achieved by wrapping a multi-ton U238
> > jacket about Ivan. The fast neutrons from Ivan fission the U238 and
> > now you have multi tons of fallout added to Ivan. This of course is
> > the fission-fusion-fission
> > bomb in mega-size. I make the fireball from 100MT about 67,000 feet in
> > diameter.
> > using known sizes and the W^1/3 relation. Walt BJ
>
> I should have said "relatively little fallout" Even with 20 tons of
> vaporized casing, it's still a fairly small amount compared to the
> contribution of even a moderate sized ground burst.
>
> I was addressing Mr. Adam's contention that it was conceivable to, on
> a clear day, depopulate the U.S> with a set of 100 MT burts at 100+
> miles in height. That's right out - the air's too thick, for those of
> us on the surface.
> Not that I'd want to be sitting next to one, mind you. IIRC, Ivan
> scorched the RC-135 that was monitoring the test from some presumed
> safe (ANd unintercepted) distance. I wonder what happened to the
> Tu-95 that dropped it?

The test was conducted by air dropping the bomb from a specially modified
Tu-95 "Bear A" strategic bomber piloted by mission commander Major Andrei E.
Durnovtsev. It was released at 10,500 meters, and made a parachute retarded
descent to 4000 meters before detonation. By that time the release bomber
was already in the safe zone some 45 km from away. The drop area was over
land at the Mityushikha Bay test site, on the west coast of Novaya Zemlya
Island . Durnovtsev was immediately promoted to lieutenant colonel and made
Hero of the Soviet Union. The Tu-95 was accompanied by a Tu-16 "Badger"
airborne laboratory to observe and record the test.

Carey Sublette

"Carey Sublette" > wrote:

:
:"Fred J. McCall" > wrote in message
.. .
:> "Carey Sublette" > wrote:
:>
:> :In Stalin's day of course he would have grown radioactive wheat and fed it
:> :to the population.
:>
:> Note that this is what they are doing right now with produce from the
:> Chernobyl area.
:>
:> :It would have saved them from starvation and immediate
:> :death, but given them a lifespan much reduced from normal.
:>
:> People grossly overestimate the effects of radiation. Not so much
:> reduced at all. A few years lower on average, at most.
:
:I believe you underestimate how radioactive the wheat would have been in
:fields downwind from a few hundred 400 kt ground bursts. This would be
:1000-10,000 times more contaminated than any from Chernobyl.

Nonsense. The radiation in the fallout zone may initially be that
much worse, but wheat is not going to pick that up in proportion. And
you still seem to be grossly overestimating the effects of radiation.
What do you think the reduction in lifespan is for folks who move into
the fallout zone?

--
"Some people get lost in thought because it's such unfamiliar
territory."
--G. Behn

"Joe Osman" > wrote in message
...

> There still there, but now its the radon doing the curing:
>
> http://cnts.wpi.edu/RSH/Docs/Radon/Index_RadSpas.htm
>
> http://www.outwestnewspaper.com/radon.html
>
> I guess suckers are still being born every minute.

Into the 1920s you could get a delicious radon cocktail to cure what ailed
you.

Weight loss was a simple as eating a tape worm, available by mail order
catalog.

"Carey Sublette" > writes:

>"John Schilling" > wrote in message
...

[Tsar Bomba barely fits in a Bear]

>> Wouldn't a deployed Tsar Bomba carrier have been a militarized Proton,
>> aka UR-500 aka 8K82? The space launch version uses only storable
>> propellants, can put twenty tons into low orbit with the smallest
>> fairing easily holding a 2 x 8 meter payload, and my references on
>> the space launch side claim that it was developed with the ICBM role
>> and the Tsar Bomba payload in mind from the start (1961).

>> Which was a stupid idea from the start, and so never implemented,
>> but rather less stupid than trying to send an overladen Bear across
>> the arctic.

>The only references I recall seeing for models that were actually made were
>bomb versions. They could have been used against NATO (but this has nothing
>to do with MAD).

>It seems likely that they investigated the Proton idea since it is the only
>way to get it to America. Do you know of any attempts to develop an RV for
>this? Can you give me any specific citations?


The one on my desk is _International Reference Guide to Space Launch
Systems_, Steven J. Isakowitz, Joseph P. Hopkins. and Joshia B. Hopkins,
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1999.

No mention of RVs, which would be outside Isakowitz's focus, but the
historical section on the Proton includes:

"The Proton launch vehicle was developed by the design bureau of Vladimir
Chelomei. The Proton was designed to serve as both a heavy missile capable
of carrying 100 megaton warheads and as a large space launch vehicle. In
competition with his rival chief designers, Sergei Korolev and Michael
Yangel, Cjhelomei proposed to build the Proton as part of a family of
Universal Rockets of various sizes and functions. The small UR-100
[became the SS-11 ICBM, then SS-19 ICBM, then Rokot and Strela launch
vehicles]. The UR-200 medium ICBM was beaten out by Yangel's R-36
[which became the SS-9 ICBM, then the Tskilon launch vehicle]. Chelomei's
UR-700 ultraheavy-lift launch vehicle design also lost out to Korolev's
N-1 for the role of a manned lunar launcher. However, the UR-500 was
selected as a military heavy-lift launcher in 1961 and was given article
number 8K82.

Because the UR-500 was to serve a military role, it needed storable
propellants and large engines to burn them. Chelomei turned to Valentin
Gushko, who had proposed such engines for Korolev's N-1 booster. Korolev
had rejected them, preferring to use less toxic oxygen/kerosene propulsion,
but the design was suitable for Proton. Engine tests from 1961 to 1965
demonstrated the propulsion system, and Chelomei's designers had considered
a number of configurations for the launch vehicle. By 1965, the first
two-stage UR-500 was completed. By this time its military role had been
dropped. The cost of building silos would have been high, and it is likely
that improvements in missile targeting began to make the Proton's huge
warheads unnecessary. The first space launch was conducted on 16 July 1965"


Only other sources I can find, are probably derived from Isakowitz. But
his work is the bible in the space launch field, so I'm inclined to
believe him. And the timing and technology both fit - right about the
time of the Tsar Bomba test, the Soviets start developing a storable
propellant rocket the right size to loft a Tsar Bomba and RV towards the
United States.


--
*John Schilling * "Anything worth doing, *
*Member:AIAA,NRA,ACLU,SAS,LP * is worth doing for money" *
*Chief Scientist & General Partner * -13th Rule of Acquisition *
*White Elephant Research, LLC * "There is no substitute *
* for success" *
*661-951-9107 or 661-275-6795 * -58th Rule of Acquisition *

Am Wed, 25 Feb 2004 10:23:56 -0500, schrieb "Kevin Brooks"
> :
>
>Not all. SADM and MADM had been withdrawn a little bit earlier in the
>eighties (my last active duty company CO had just returned from a three year
>tour with the ADM company in Vincenza, Italy). The writing had been on the
>wall since at least 1985, when the Engineer School finally stopped making
>its new LT's spend a couple of days in a secure compound at Belvoir learning
>the very basics of ADM employment and planning. But the arty rounds did not
>return stateside until about the same time, or shortly after, the Wall came
>down. The last ones were withdrawn from the stockpile in 1992 according to
>the Nuclear Weapons Archive. The Pershing II and GLCM were of course
>governed by the theater nuclear forces treaty (1988 IIRC); not sure about
>the arty rounds being covered by that treaty (would have been hard to
>verify).

Could you give in some applications for the SADM? ISTR from childhood
(80s) that there were plans to destroy a lot of bridges and so on with
atomic bombs. Why was it thought necessary to use those instead of
conventional explosives? Aside from the fact that using nuclear
weopons just for the fun in a friendly country might not be overly
popular there.

Owe
--
My from-adress is valid and being read.
www.owejessen.de

In article >, Owe Jessen
> wrote:


>
> Could you give in some applications for the SADM? ISTR from childhood
> (80s) that there were plans to destroy a lot of bridges and so on with
> atomic bombs. Why was it thought necessary to use those instead of
> conventional explosives? Aside from the fact that using nuclear
> weopons just for the fun in a friendly country might not be overly
> popular there.

Bridges, roads through mountain passes, and other things that took a lot
of explosive to bring down. Even though a bridge might be built with
demolition chambers, for safety reasons, you probably don't want to
leave them loaded (if not primed). ADMs weighing in the hundreds of
pounds (IIRC for the MADM, much less for the SADM) could be brought in
much more easily, when needed, than tons of high explosive.

There was also a Special Operations capability to use the SADM
offensively, against enemy targets such as dams.

Fred J. McCall > wrote in message >...
> "Carey Sublette" > wrote:
>
> :
> :"Fred J. McCall" > wrote in message
> .. .
> :> "Carey Sublette" > wrote:
> :>
> :> :In Stalin's day of course he would have grown radioactive wheat and fed it
> :> :to the population.
> :>
> :> Note that this is what they are doing right now with produce from the
> :> Chernobyl area.
> :>
> :> :It would have saved them from starvation and immediate
> :> :death, but given them a lifespan much reduced from normal.
> :>
> :> People grossly overestimate the effects of radiation. Not so much
> :> reduced at all. A few years lower on average, at most.
> :
> :I believe you underestimate how radioactive the wheat would have been in
> :fields downwind from a few hundred 400 kt ground bursts. This would be
> :1000-10,000 times more contaminated than any from Chernobyl.
>
> Nonsense. The radiation in the fallout zone may initially be that
> much worse, but wheat is not going to pick that up in proportion. And
> you still seem to be grossly overestimating the effects of radiation.
> What do you think the reduction in lifespan is for folks who move into
> the fallout zone?

What part of 1961 did you wander in from?

1962
Silent Spring published; documented the effect of chemicals on the
environment. (more)

Discovered breeding line that could restore fertility to male-sterile
wheat plants.

Library collection of USDA designated as National Agricultural
Library.

Cereal leaf beetle discovered to be established in Michigan.

Purified and structurally identified three soluble ribonucleic acids
(RNAs). (more)

Developed method for built-in permanent creases for wool trousers.

First laboratory test developed to detect bluetongue neutralizing
antibody.

Released four inbred lines that resulted in first commercial
production of hybrid seed of pearl millet.

Developed methods using calcium to remove strontium-90 radioactivity
from wheat and milk.

http://www.ars.usda.gov/is/timeline/1960chron.htm

"John Schilling" > wrote in message
...
> "Carey Sublette" > writes:
>
> >"John Schilling" > wrote in message
> ...
>
> [Tsar Bomba barely fits in a Bear]
>
> >> Wouldn't a deployed Tsar Bomba carrier have been a militarized Proton,
> >> aka UR-500 aka 8K82? The space launch version uses only storable
> >> propellants, can put twenty tons into low orbit with the smallest
> >> fairing easily holding a 2 x 8 meter payload, and my references on
> >> the space launch side claim that it was developed with the ICBM role
> >> and the Tsar Bomba payload in mind from the start (1961).
>
> >> Which was a stupid idea from the start, and so never implemented,
> >> but rather less stupid than trying to send an overladen Bear across
> >> the arctic.
>
> >The only references I recall seeing for models that were actually made
were
> >bomb versions. They could have been used against NATO (but this has
nothing
> >to do with MAD).
>
> >It seems likely that they investigated the Proton idea since it is the
only
> >way to get it to America. Do you know of any attempts to develop an RV
for
> >this? Can you give me any specific citations?
>
>
> The one on my desk is _International Reference Guide to Space Launch
> Systems_, Steven J. Isakowitz, Joseph P. Hopkins. and Joshia B. Hopkins,
> American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1999.
>
> No mention of RVs, which would be outside Isakowitz's focus, but the
> historical section on the Proton includes:
>
> "The Proton launch vehicle was developed by the design bureau of Vladimir
> Chelomei. The Proton was designed to serve as both a heavy missile
capable
> of carrying 100 megaton warheads and as a large space launch vehicle. In
> competition with his rival chief designers, Sergei Korolev and Michael
> Yangel, Cjhelomei proposed to build the Proton as part of a family of
> Universal Rockets of various sizes and functions. The small UR-100
> [became the SS-11 ICBM, then SS-19 ICBM, then Rokot and Strela launch
> vehicles]. The UR-200 medium ICBM was beaten out by Yangel's R-36
> [which became the SS-9 ICBM, then the Tskilon launch vehicle]. Chelomei's
> UR-700 ultraheavy-lift launch vehicle design also lost out to Korolev's
> N-1 for the role of a manned lunar launcher. However, the UR-500 was
> selected as a military heavy-lift launcher in 1961 and was given article
> number 8K82.
>
> Because the UR-500 was to serve a military role, it needed storable
> propellants and large engines to burn them. Chelomei turned to Valentin
> Gushko, who had proposed such engines for Korolev's N-1 booster. Korolev
> had rejected them, preferring to use less toxic oxygen/kerosene
propulsion,
> but the design was suitable for Proton. Engine tests from 1961 to 1965
> demonstrated the propulsion system, and Chelomei's designers had
considered
> a number of configurations for the launch vehicle. By 1965, the first
> two-stage UR-500 was completed. By this time its military role had been
> dropped. The cost of building silos would have been high, and it is
likely
> that improvements in missile targeting began to make the Proton's huge
> warheads unnecessary. The first space launch was conducted on 16 July
1965"
>
>
> Only other sources I can find, are probably derived from Isakowitz. But
> his work is the bible in the space launch field, so I'm inclined to
> believe him. And the timing and technology both fit - right about the
> time of the Tsar Bomba test, the Soviets start developing a storable
> propellant rocket the right size to loft a Tsar Bomba and RV towards the
> United States.

There discussion of this launcher, and its possible military role in Sergei
Khruschev's "Nikita Khruschev and the Creation of a Superpower" (2000). The
book has a fair amount of discussion of missiles, partly because Sergei was
an engineer for Chelomei. He is quite careful about missile designations,
and given his professional role his comments about Chelomei in particular
have a lot of credibility.

He introduces the UR-500 on pg. 472, in a scene where Chelomei is making a
pitch to Khruschev and the Defense Council for a role in ICBM development
(then assigned to Korolyev) in Feb. 1962:

"After completing his description of the UB [a guided ballistic warhead],
Chelomei began to outline proposals for developing a heavy booster rocket.
Vladimir Nikolayevich wanted to use it to launch space stations. (discussion
of the space station concept omitted). The diagram Chelomei displayed to the
Defense Council showed a space booster capable of lifting twelve tons into
orbit. It was called the UR-500. The booster's launch weight was impressive,
almost seven hundred tons. Other diagram displayed military aspects of the
UR-500. Proposals called for using it as a ballistic missile, with the
thrity megaton warhead which had been tested in the recent past."

On pg. 466 he discusses the Tsar Bomba test:

"... preparations were under way in October to set off a nuclear blast of
fantastic power - fifty megatons. Three such monsters, of thirty, fifty, and
one hundred megatons, had been prepared. It was decided to set off the
middle one. .. The problem was there was no booster rocket able to lift such
a heavy warhead."

I have read elsewhere that lower yield derivatives of the Tsar Bomba were
developed, including one of 30 Mt.

From this it seems that the UR-500 was developed primarily as a booster, but
with a possible military role inspired by the superbomb test in October
1961. From 1962 until some time after 1965 no booster would have been
available for any such large bomb (be it 30 Mt or 100 Mt), and only bomb
delivery existed as an option. By 1965 I think the gargantuanism popular
with Khruschev had fallen out of favor and they were no longer thinking of
deploying a weapon of this size as a warhead

Carey Sublette

"Fred J. McCall" > wrote in message
...
> "Carey Sublette" > wrote:
>
> :
> :"Fred J. McCall" > wrote in message
> .. .
> :> "Carey Sublette" > wrote:
> :>
> :> :In Stalin's day of course he would have grown radioactive wheat and
fed it
> :> :to the population.
> :>
> :> Note that this is what they are doing right now with produce from the
> :> Chernobyl area.
> :>
> :> :It would have saved them from starvation and immediate
> :> :death, but given them a lifespan much reduced from normal.
> :>
> :> People grossly overestimate the effects of radiation. Not so much
> :> reduced at all. A few years lower on average, at most.
> :
> :I believe you underestimate how radioactive the wheat would have been in
> :fields downwind from a few hundred 400 kt ground bursts. This would be
> :1000-10,000 times more contaminated than any from Chernobyl.
>
> Nonsense. The radiation in the fallout zone may initially be that
> much worse, but wheat is not going to pick that up in proportion.

Actually it will. Why do you think it wouldn't? As a fraction of the ion
concentration in the root zone the radioactive Sr and Cs is negligible. The
plant will pick up the same proportion of the contaminant whether it is 1
curie per square kilometer or 100,000.

>And
> you still seem to be grossly overestimating the effects of radiation.
> What do you think the reduction in lifespan is for folks who move into
> the fallout zone?

For a portion of them, not very much.
For the portion that gets bone cancer, it is considerable.

Owe Jessen > wrote:

:Could you give in some applications for the SADM? ISTR from childhood
:(80s) that there were plans to destroy a lot of bridges and so on with
:atomic bombs. Why was it thought necessary to use those instead of
:conventional explosives? Aside from the fact that using nuclear
:weopons just for the fun in a friendly country might not be overly
:popular there.

Because wiring a modern bridge with sufficient explosives to bring it
down is not a quick job. Failure to manage this cost the Germans
dearly in WWII.

Either we wire them up and leave them that way in peacetime (not real
safe) or you take them down fast with nukes in wartime.

--
"Rule Number One for Slayers - Don't die."
-- Buffy, the Vampire Slayer

Am Fri, 27 Feb 2004 03:15:43 GMT, schrieb Fred J. McCall
> :

>Owe Jessen > wrote:
>
>:Could you give in some applications for the SADM? ISTR from childhood
>:(80s) that there were plans to destroy a lot of bridges and so on with
>:atomic bombs. Why was it thought necessary to use those instead of
>:conventional explosives? Aside from the fact that using nuclear
>:weopons just for the fun in a friendly country might not be overly
>:popular there.
>
>Because wiring a modern bridge with sufficient explosives to bring it
>down is not a quick job. Failure to manage this cost the Germans
>dearly in WWII.
>
>Either we wire them up and leave them that way in peacetime (not real
>safe) or you take them down fast with nukes in wartime.

I guess the folks living next to the bridges were thrilled. Or was the
plan to use it only, if nuclear weapons were allready being used?

Owe
--
My from-adress is valid and being read.
www.owejessen.de

In article >, Owe Jessen
> wrote:

> Am Fri, 27 Feb 2004 03:15:43 GMT, schrieb Fred J. McCall
> > :
>
> >Owe Jessen > wrote:
> >
> >:Could you give in some applications for the SADM? ISTR from childhood
> >:(80s) that there were plans to destroy a lot of bridges and so on with
> >:atomic bombs. Why was it thought necessary to use those instead of
> >:conventional explosives? Aside from the fact that using nuclear
> >:weopons just for the fun in a friendly country might not be overly
> >:popular there.
> >
> >Because wiring a modern bridge with sufficient explosives to bring it
> >down is not a quick job. Failure to manage this cost the Germans
> >dearly in WWII.
> >
> >Either we wire them up and leave them that way in peacetime (not real
> >safe) or you take them down fast with nukes in wartime.
>
> I guess the folks living next to the bridges were thrilled. Or was the
> plan to use it only, if nuclear weapons were allready being used?

It probably would have been used only after the nuclear threshold had
been crossed, but that might not mean much to the people near the
bridge. The smaller ADMs were definitely in the subkiloton range.
Conventional bombing before precision-guided weapons, even with such
advanced things as Barnes Wallace's earthquake bombs, still needed
substantial subkiloton yields.

If the high explosive, in the multi-ton range, were prepositioned in the
bridge, even without primers, is that going to comfort the nearby
residents?

The reality is that it takes a substantial explosive force to take down
a major bridge or mountain road cut.

Owe Jessen > wrote:

:Am Fri, 27 Feb 2004 03:15:43 GMT, schrieb Fred J. McCall
> :
:
:>Owe Jessen > wrote:
:>
:>:Could you give in some applications for the SADM? ISTR from childhood
:>:(80s) that there were plans to destroy a lot of bridges and so on with
:>:atomic bombs. Why was it thought necessary to use those instead of
:>:conventional explosives? Aside from the fact that using nuclear
:>:weopons just for the fun in a friendly country might not be overly
:>:popular there.
:>
:>Because wiring a modern bridge with sufficient explosives to bring it
:>down is not a quick job. Failure to manage this cost the Germans
:>dearly in WWII.
:>
:>Either we wire them up and leave them that way in peacetime (not real
:>safe) or you take them down fast with nukes in wartime.
:
:I guess the folks living next to the bridges were thrilled. Or was the
:plan to use it only, if nuclear weapons were allready being used?

You might want to look at the yield of something like SADM. We're
hardly talking about a galaxy-shaking cataclysm here.

--
"Rule Number One for Slayers - Don't die."
-- Buffy, the Vampire Slayer

Howard Berkowitz > wrote:

:It probably would have been used only after the nuclear threshold had
:been crossed, but that might not mean much to the people near the
:bridge.

I think I disagree with Howard. The point of using these things was
so that you didn't have to unleash tactical nukes on big Soviet tank
formations to stop them. You could just blow all the bridges quickly
and slow them down that way.

By definition, *some* nuclear threshold would have been crossed at
about the time the first one went off, but since these things would be
targeted against infrastructure in advance of the Soviets, it would be
rather difficult for them to claim them as justification for crossing
the nuclear threshold themselves.

They were also another good reason why we declined to sign a 'no first
use' policy. We intended to use these things first, because blowing
all the bridges made good tactical sense.

Unless you're practically living on the bridge, these things aren't
really a problem for neighbors. Don't overestimate effects just
because the bugaboo word 'nuclear' (actually 'atomic') is involved.
They'd have a much bigger problem from that Guards tank regiment going
through their carrot patch if the bridge was left up.

--
"Rule Number One for Slayers - Don't die."
-- Buffy, the Vampire Slayer

In article >,
wrote:

> Howard Berkowitz > wrote:
>
> :It probably would have been used only after the nuclear threshold had
> :been crossed, but that might not mean much to the people near the
> :bridge.
>
> I think I disagree with Howard. The point of using these things was
> so that you didn't have to unleash tactical nukes on big Soviet tank
> formations to stop them. You could just blow all the bridges quickly
> and slow them down that way.

It's hard to say. _Soviet Military Strategy_, written under the
direction of Marshal Sokolovsky and originally translated by the RAND
Corporation [a summary available at
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1976/may-jun/wh
iting.html] strongly suggests, along with other sources, that the
Soviets planned first use of theater nuclear weapons in a large-scale
attack on Western Europe. As you know, the Soviet decision whether or
not to strike first has been debated in many future predictions as well
as staff studies. See both volumes of Sir John Hackett's _The Third
World War_ for scenarios with and without Soviet nuclear first use.

I would agree, Fred, that the first NATO use of nuclear weapons indeed
might be to take out chokepoints such as bridges and mountain passes.
Perhaps I didn't make it clear that when I spoke of crossing the nuclear
threshold, I believe that threshold would first have been crossed by the
Warsaw Pact, principally to isolate the battlefield and hard-kill air
support and C3I in preparation for the major ground attack.

>
> By definition, *some* nuclear threshold would have been crossed at
> about the time the first one went off, but since these things would be
> targeted against infrastructure in advance of the Soviets, it would be
> rather difficult for them to claim them as justification for crossing
> the nuclear threshold themselves.
>
> They were also another good reason why we declined to sign a 'no first
> use' policy. We intended to use these things first, because blowing
> all the bridges made good tactical sense.
>
> Unless you're practically living on the bridge, these things aren't
> really a problem for neighbors. Don't overestimate effects just
> because the bugaboo word 'nuclear' (actually 'atomic') is involved.
> They'd have a much bigger problem from that Guards tank regiment going
> through their carrot patch if the bridge was left up.

"Tom Adams" wrote
> (Peter Stickney) wrote
> >
> > Size and Weight. Nobody was capable of putting a 30-40 ton warhead of
> > that size at those heights. Well, that, and atmospheric attenuation -
> > all the prompt stuff, and the heat, gets absobed pretty quickly by the
> > Atmosphere,
>
> Less than half the radiant energy of the sun is absorbed.

From Glassstone (10.29), "stopping altitude" is the altitude below which
there is no significant ionizing effect for radiation sourced from above.
From table 10.29, the most penetrating prompt ionizing radiation (gamma and
neutrons) stop at 15 miles altitude.

For the thermal pulse, most of the thermal effects from a thermonuclear
weapon are sourced from X-ray heated air. For an exo-atmospheric detonation,
the thermal source region will be at approximately 270Kfeet altitude
(7.91-92). Again from Glassstone "In fact for bursts at altitudes exceeding
some 330,000 feet (63 minles) the thermal radiation from a nuclear explosion
even in the megaton range is essentially ineffective so far as skin burns,
ignitition etc..."

"Owe Jessen" > wrote in message
...
> Am Fri, 27 Feb 2004 03:15:43 GMT, schrieb Fred J. McCall
> > :
>
> >Owe Jessen > wrote:
> >
> >:Could you give in some applications for the SADM? ISTR from childhood
> >:(80s) that there were plans to destroy a lot of bridges and so on with
> >:atomic bombs. Why was it thought necessary to use those instead of
> >:conventional explosives? Aside from the fact that using nuclear
> >:weopons just for the fun in a friendly country might not be overly
> >:popular there.
> >
> >Because wiring a modern bridge with sufficient explosives to bring it
> >down is not a quick job. Failure to manage this cost the Germans
> >dearly in WWII.
> >
> >Either we wire them up and leave them that way in peacetime (not real
> >safe) or you take them down fast with nukes in wartime.
>
> I guess the folks living next to the bridges were thrilled. Or was the
> plan to use it only, if nuclear weapons were allready being used?

Bridges were not a very common target for SADM. In point of fact, the
earlier poster almost had it right when he mentioned the "already wired up"
bit in reference to bridges. Most of the bridges and large overpasses in
West Germany were "prechambered" for demolition; that meant that there were
cavities incorporated into the structure (usually with manhole access).
Nearby would be a reinforced concrete magazine/bunker where the charges were
stored--usually "cheese charges", the name coming from the fact that they
resembled large wheels of cheese. Conduits were included, with pull-through
lead lines used for pulling the det cord initiations system to the chamber.
In the event of war, these reserve demolition targets would be prepared by
German personnel from the WBK (a quasi-military structured German civil
service organization, IIRC). These same folks also were responsible for
other obstacle systems; they had some really neat steel I-beam
anti-vehicular obstacles that featured pre-installed receptacles in the
roadway. Remove the cover, slide the beam down, and a pin locked it into
place such that you'd have to use explosives (or spend a lot of time with a
cutting torch) to remove it.

SADM would have been used by two different organizations--the regular US
Army engineer atomic demolition munitions (ADM) companies, usually supported
by a corps level combat engineer battalion, or the Special Forces, who also
had some ADM capabilities and (reportedly) targets. You used it when you had
to take out a target that was just too cumbersome to use conventional
explosives on. Things like dropping a big chunk of highway constructed in a
side-hill cut, or against your own airfields before they were overrun as a
denial measure, or possibly even a dam. The only bridges that would have
been likely SADM reserve targets would have been something like very large
suspension bridges (large suspension bridges are a real bear to try and
destroy with conventional demo). As a nuclear weapon, use of SADM could only
occur after weapons release was granted from the NCA--it had a PAL device to
prevent unauthorized use. No code for the PAL, and the weapon would crunch
itself so that it would not be usable.

The folks who lived next to ADM targets likely never knew it. The engineers
who served in the few ADM companies we had in Europe actually received a
civilian clothing allowance so that they could recon and update their target
folders without being too obvious. I had an E-5 who reclassified from ADM
(MOS 12E) to straight combat engineer (12B) back when they were drawing down
the ADM companies in the mid-eighties and was assigned to my platoon--his
biggest bitch was that he had lost his civilian clothing allowance!

Brooks

>
> Owe
> --
> My from-adress is valid and being read.
> www.owejessen.de

"Howard Berkowitz" > wrote in message
...
> In article >, Owe Jessen
> > wrote:
>
> > Am Fri, 27 Feb 2004 03:15:43 GMT, schrieb Fred J. McCall
> > > :
> >
> > >Owe Jessen > wrote:
> > >
> > >:Could you give in some applications for the SADM? ISTR from childhood
> > >:(80s) that there were plans to destroy a lot of bridges and so on with
> > >:atomic bombs. Why was it thought necessary to use those instead of
> > >:conventional explosives? Aside from the fact that using nuclear
> > >:weopons just for the fun in a friendly country might not be overly
> > >:popular there.
> > >
> > >Because wiring a modern bridge with sufficient explosives to bring it
> > >down is not a quick job. Failure to manage this cost the Germans
> > >dearly in WWII.
> > >
> > >Either we wire them up and leave them that way in peacetime (not real
> > >safe) or you take them down fast with nukes in wartime.
> >
> > I guess the folks living next to the bridges were thrilled. Or was the
> > plan to use it only, if nuclear weapons were allready being used?
>
> It probably would have been used only after the nuclear threshold had
> been crossed, but that might not mean much to the people near the
> bridge. The smaller ADMs were definitely in the subkiloton range.
> Conventional bombing before precision-guided weapons, even with such
> advanced things as Barnes Wallace's earthquake bombs, still needed
> substantial subkiloton yields.

The vast majority of bridges were prechambered and would have been dropped
with conventional charges. ADM's would only have been used on the
largest/nastiest of possible targets.

>
> If the high explosive, in the multi-ton range, were prepositioned in the
> bridge, even without primers, is that going to comfort the nearby
> residents?

Happened all the time, with boosters and primers. Drive through germany and
look at the terrain near large bridges and you'll likely find the old
magazine bunkers where the charges for the prechambers were stored.

>
> The reality is that it takes a substantial explosive force to take down
> a major bridge or mountain road cut.

The road cut, yes. As to bridges, with prechambers you can drop anything
built with the possible exception of large suspension structures. Without
prechambers you have to use a bit more demo material, and the prep time
climbs, but you can still drop the vast majority of structures, or a portion
thereof (one span and one set of piers is all it usually required).

Brooks

Howard Berkowitz > wrote:

:I would agree, Fred, that the first NATO use of nuclear weapons indeed
:might be to take out chokepoints such as bridges and mountain passes.
:Perhaps I didn't make it clear that when I spoke of crossing the nuclear
:threshold, I believe that threshold would first have been crossed by the
:Warsaw Pact, principally to isolate the battlefield and hard-kill air
:support and C3I in preparation for the major ground attack.

I always considered that they'd paste such things with persistent
chemicals, instead. Kill all the depots that way. While we sometimes
claim that we would go nuclear in the face of a chemical attack, would
we really have done it?

I'm unconvinced we would have done so against the Soviet Union.

--
"Rule Number One for Slayers - Don't die."
-- Buffy, the Vampire Slayer

In article >,
Fred J. McCall > wrote:

> I always considered that they'd paste such things with persistent
> chemicals, instead. Kill all the depots that way. While we sometimes
> claim that we would go nuclear in the face of a chemical attack, would
> we really have done it?
>
> I'm unconvinced we would have done so against the Soviet Union.

If the USSR was into the realm of dropping planeloads of chemicals on
depots and such, it's hard to imagine that the war wouldn't have crossed
into the "screw 'em, what have we got ready to launch?" phase.

They built tactical nukes for a *reason*, you know.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote:

>(large suspension bridges are a real bear to try and
>destroy with conventional demo)

Seems to me that a largish FLSC (Flexible Linear Shaped Charge) would
do to sever one or both of the main suspension lines.

D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

Chad Irby > wrote:

:In article >,
: Fred J. McCall > wrote:
:
:> I always considered that they'd paste such things with persistent
:> chemicals, instead. Kill all the depots that way. While we sometimes
:> claim that we would go nuclear in the face of a chemical attack, would
:> we really have done it?
:>
:> I'm unconvinced we would have done so against the Soviet Union.
:
:If the USSR was into the realm of dropping planeloads of chemicals on
:depots and such, it's hard to imagine that the war wouldn't have crossed
:into the "screw 'em, what have we got ready to launch?" phase.
:
:They built tactical nukes for a *reason*, you know.

Yes, they did, and the Soviets had their share of them. Would we have
fired the first one in response to a chemical attack in the face of
"if you shoot a nuke, we'll empty our magazines back at you after YOUR
first use"?

I still don't think so, unless there wasn't another choice.

--
"Rule Number One for Slayers - Don't die."
-- Buffy, the Vampire Slayer

"Derek Lyons" > wrote in message
...
> "Kevin Brooks" > wrote:
>
> >(large suspension bridges are a real bear to try and
> >destroy with conventional demo)
>
> Seems to me that a largish FLSC (Flexible Linear Shaped Charge) would
> do to sever one or both of the main suspension lines.

Not really. Take a gander at the size of the suspension cables for a large
bridge--they can be up to around three or more feet in diameter (the Golden
Gate is a bit over 36 inches). Take a gander at what kind of shaped charge
liner it would take to penetrate what is essentially 18 inches of steel, and
how much explosive is required to back it. Then imagine how massive that
puppy would have to be to get around that three foot cable. When we were
taught bridge demo, the large suspension bridge was not even really
addressed (I can recall an instructor flippantly remarking that it would
probably be best to just park a couple of fuel trucks under the cable at its
lowest point and light them off and hope that the thermal loading degraded
the strength enough to drop it). Given *lot's* of prep time you could make
it work, but you'd probably have to resort to precutting the cable part way
with a torch. I can recall an old Alistair MacLean novel where the bad guys
were going to drop the Golden Gate with "beehive" charges--but imagine the
efffect if you did wrap a ring of maybe the standard 40 pound chaped charges
around one of those cables. You'd end up with a few small diameter holes
penetrating most if not all of the way to the center, but you'd only be
taking out maybe 15 percent of the cross sectional area, which is unlikely
to do anything other than weaken the structure.

Brooks
>
> D.
> --
> Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

In article >,
"Kevin Brooks" > wrote:

> When we were taught bridge demo, the large suspension bridge was not
> even really addressed (I can recall an instructor flippantly
> remarking that it would probably be best to just park a couple of
> fuel trucks under the cable at its lowest point and light them off
> and hope that the thermal loading degraded the strength enough to
> drop it).

One of those "how to knock down buildings" shows on Discovery showed a
medium-sized suspension bridge somewhere getting knocked down, and they
didn't screw with the main cables for the primary cuts. They just
knocked down the vertical suspending cables with a *lot* of much smaller
charges, taking out the deck. I suppose they went back later and cut
the big cables, but if you don't have something to drive on, it's not
that useful, especially in the short term.

Now, if you had some good prep time, a half-ton chunk of thermite
wrapped around the cable could be interesting...

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

"Chad Irby" wrote
> "Kevin Brooks" wrote:
>
> > When we were taught bridge demo, the large suspension bridge was not
> > even really addressed (I can recall an instructor flippantly
> > remarking that it would probably be best to just park a couple of
> > fuel trucks under the cable at its lowest point and light them off
> > and hope that the thermal loading degraded the strength enough to
> > drop it).
>
> One of those "how to knock down buildings" shows on Discovery showed a
> medium-sized suspension bridge somewhere getting knocked down, and they
> didn't screw with the main cables for the primary cuts. They just
> knocked down the vertical suspending cables with a *lot* of much smaller
> charges, taking out the deck. I suppose they went back later and cut
> the big cables, but if you don't have something to drive on, it's not
> that useful, especially in the short term.
>
> Now, if you had some good prep time, a half-ton chunk of thermite
> wrapped around the cable could be interesting...

I would think the anchors at the ends of the suspension cables would be a
fruitful place to start but somehow I don't think the Golden Gate's anchors
have prebuilt demo chambers.

"Chad Irby" wrote
> Fred J. McCall wrote:
>
> > I always considered that they'd paste such things with persistent
> > chemicals, instead. Kill all the depots that way. While we sometimes
> > claim that we would go nuclear in the face of a chemical attack, would
> > we really have done it?
> >
> > I'm unconvinced we would have done so against the Soviet Union.
>
> If the USSR was into the realm of dropping planeloads of chemicals on
> depots and such, it's hard to imagine that the war wouldn't have crossed
> into the "screw 'em, what have we got ready to launch?" phase.
>
> They built tactical nukes for a *reason*, you know.

A not very well thought out reason. Unless you are willing to detail nuclear
targeting to an SF sergeant or a FAC, aside from some rear-area logistics
and transportation targets, the intended target set was either too fleeting
or too close to FLOT. The weapon release/target authorization cycle was just
too long. Then there was the memorable phrase that "West German villages
averaged 3KT apart".

What made the Red Tide recede were things like Pave Mover, the associated
strike weapons systems and US training and doctrine that resulted in US arms
able to move_lots_faster than the Sovs' system of command and control. That
last is interesting because during the sixties and seventies, much of the
literature credited the Soviet system of battle drills as delivering a very
flexible and fast responding tactical instrument to Soviet commanders. Then
it came to light that most of those "battle drills" were practiced by crowds
of Soviet soldiers running up and down hillsides chanting "tank, tank,
tank..." (OK, I made that last part up but the running part was true).

I have a book called "Measuring Military Power" (Joshua Epstein) from that
era that tried to calculate war-fighting ability, taking into account the
short lifetimes of Soviet-era equipment. What Epstein missed was that if the
aircraft and tank engines had 500 hour lives then not much training got
done, just Gun Decked. False reporting gave the Soviets (and western intel
shops) wildly optimistic views of Soviet readiness states that started to
evaporate in Afghanistan.

In article >, "Kevin Brooks"
> wrote:

> "Owe Jessen" > wrote in message
> ...
> > Am Fri, 27 Feb 2004 03:15:43 GMT, schrieb Fred J. McCall
> > > :
> >
> > >Owe Jessen > wrote:
> > >
> > >:Could you give in some applications for the SADM? ISTR from childhood
> > >:(80s) that there were plans to destroy a lot of bridges and so on
> > >:with
> > >:atomic bombs. Why was it thought necessary to use those instead of
> > >:conventional explosives? Aside from the fact that using nuclear
> > >:weopons just for the fun in a friendly country might not be overly
> > >:popular there.
> > >
> > >Because wiring a modern bridge with sufficient explosives to bring it
> > >down is not a quick job. Failure to manage this cost the Germans
> > >dearly in WWII.
> > >
> > >Either we wire them up and leave them that way in peacetime (not real
> > >safe) or you take them down fast with nukes in wartime.
> >
> > I guess the folks living next to the bridges were thrilled. Or was the
> > plan to use it only, if nuclear weapons were allready being used?
>
> Bridges were not a very common target for SADM.

I have to admit I was using "bridge" as shorthand for "transportation
bottleneck," as it hadn't been used precisely in every case. Yes, I
agree that the most probable defensive use of ADMs would be road cuts,
where you aren't just destroying structural integrity of a bridge, but
needing to cause the collapse of hundreds to thousands of tons of rock.

They still might have made sense for a "friendly" bridge that had not
been prechambered, or for special operations against bridges in the
enemy rear.

No code for the PAL, and the weapon would
> crunch
> itself so that it would not be usable.

IIRC, the ADMs had fairly simple PALs -- essentially combination locks
that could not reasonably be bypassed in the field. These were
significantly different from the later, limited retry, multiple code
option PALs, which would also destroy key components of the devices.

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
. ..
>
> "Chad Irby" wrote
> > "Kevin Brooks" wrote:
> >
> > > When we were taught bridge demo, the large suspension bridge was not
> > > even really addressed (I can recall an instructor flippantly
> > > remarking that it would probably be best to just park a couple of
> > > fuel trucks under the cable at its lowest point and light them off
> > > and hope that the thermal loading degraded the strength enough to
> > > drop it).
> >
> > One of those "how to knock down buildings" shows on Discovery showed a
> > medium-sized suspension bridge somewhere getting knocked down, and they
> > didn't screw with the main cables for the primary cuts. They just
> > knocked down the vertical suspending cables with a *lot* of much smaller
> > charges, taking out the deck. I suppose they went back later and cut
> > the big cables, but if you don't have something to drive on, it's not
> > that useful, especially in the short term.
> >
> > Now, if you had some good prep time, a half-ton chunk of thermite
> > wrapped around the cable could be interesting...
>
> I would think the anchors at the ends of the suspension cables would be a
> fruitful place to start but somehow I don't think the Golden Gate's
anchors
> have prebuilt demo chambers.

You'd probably need some pretty massive prechambers. The weight for each
anchor on the Golden Gate is a whopping 60 thousand tons. Which would be
equivalent to a solid cube with sides a bit over 30 yards long. Buried.
Merely busting up that reinforced concrete behemoth does not guarantee
success, either, as long as the bulk of the mass remains in place and the
reinforcing steel continues to distribute the load throughout the bulk.

Brooks

Brooks
>
>

"Howard Berkowitz" > wrote in message
...
> In article >, "Kevin Brooks"
> > wrote:
>
> > "Owe Jessen" > wrote in message
> > ...
> > > Am Fri, 27 Feb 2004 03:15:43 GMT, schrieb Fred J. McCall
> > > > :
> > >
> > > >Owe Jessen > wrote:
> > > >
> > > >:Could you give in some applications for the SADM? ISTR from
childhood
> > > >:(80s) that there were plans to destroy a lot of bridges and so on
> > > >:with
> > > >:atomic bombs. Why was it thought necessary to use those instead of
> > > >:conventional explosives? Aside from the fact that using nuclear
> > > >:weopons just for the fun in a friendly country might not be overly
> > > >:popular there.
> > > >
> > > >Because wiring a modern bridge with sufficient explosives to bring it
> > > >down is not a quick job. Failure to manage this cost the Germans
> > > >dearly in WWII.
> > > >
> > > >Either we wire them up and leave them that way in peacetime (not real
> > > >safe) or you take them down fast with nukes in wartime.
> > >
> > > I guess the folks living next to the bridges were thrilled. Or was the
> > > plan to use it only, if nuclear weapons were allready being used?
> >
> > Bridges were not a very common target for SADM.
>
> I have to admit I was using "bridge" as shorthand for "transportation
> bottleneck," as it hadn't been used precisely in every case. Yes, I
> agree that the most probable defensive use of ADMs would be road cuts,
> where you aren't just destroying structural integrity of a bridge, but
> needing to cause the collapse of hundreds to thousands of tons of rock.
>
> They still might have made sense for a "friendly" bridge that had not
> been prechambered, or for special operations against bridges in the
> enemy rear.
>
> No code for the PAL, and the weapon would
> > crunch
> > itself so that it would not be usable.
>
> IIRC, the ADMs had fairly simple PALs -- essentially combination locks
> that could not reasonably be bypassed in the field. These were
> significantly different from the later, limited retry, multiple code
> option PALs, which would also destroy key components of the devices.

It has been quite a few years since I sat through the very basic lectures we
received on the SADM (being in the very last EOBC class to go through that
phase), but IIRC the PAL was set up such that failure to input the proper
code would result in the device inerting itself. Or at least that was what
we were told as we viewed the training device from our stadium seating
arrangement. It was not that big a deal for us--our job was to be able to
run the calcualtions for emplacement requirements (i.e., determine the depth
of placment required to acheive the required effect)--the ADM guys, who had
to attend a special ADM course (which was three to five weeks long, IIRC),
would have been the guys doing the arming. We were supposed to be able to
help arm it and if necessary provide the demolition guard (minus the
requirement for actually firing the device).

Brooks

In article >, "Kevin Brooks"
> wrote:

> "Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
> . ..
> >
> > "Chad Irby" wrote
> > > "Kevin Brooks" wrote:
> > >
> > > > When we were taught bridge demo, the large suspension bridge was
> > > > not
> > > > even really addressed (I can recall an instructor flippantly
> > > > remarking that it would probably be best to just park a couple of
> > > > fuel trucks under the cable at its lowest point and light them off
> > > > and hope that the thermal loading degraded the strength enough to
> > > > drop it).
> > >
> > > One of those "how to knock down buildings" shows on Discovery showed
> > > a
> > > medium-sized suspension bridge somewhere getting knocked down, and
> > > they
> > > didn't screw with the main cables for the primary cuts. They just
> > > knocked down the vertical suspending cables with a *lot* of much
> > > smaller
> > > charges, taking out the deck. I suppose they went back later and cut
> > > the big cables, but if you don't have something to drive on, it's not
> > > that useful, especially in the short term.
> > >
> > > Now, if you had some good prep time, a half-ton chunk of thermite
> > > wrapped around the cable could be interesting...
> >
> > I would think the anchors at the ends of the suspension cables would be
> > a
> > fruitful place to start but somehow I don't think the Golden Gate's
> anchors
> > have prebuilt demo chambers.
>
> You'd probably need some pretty massive prechambers. The weight for each
> anchor on the Golden Gate is a whopping 60 thousand tons. Which would be
> equivalent to a solid cube with sides a bit over 30 yards long. Buried.
> Merely busting up that reinforced concrete behemoth does not guarantee
> success, either, as long as the bulk of the mass remains in place and the
> reinforcing steel continues to distribute the load throughout the bulk.

Hmmmm...it's California, after all. I wonder if a sufficient number of
troops indulging in California's most valuable agricultural crop could
get into a mindspace to levitate it?

In article >, "Kevin Brooks"
> wrote:


> It has been quite a few years since I sat through the very basic lectures
> we
> received on the SADM (being in the very last EOBC class to go through
> that
> phase), but IIRC the PAL was set up such that failure to input the proper
> code would result in the device inerting itself.

From my recollection of open sources, the inerting was of the arming
mechanism, not the actual nuclear components. In other words, to use it,
you'd have to build and reinstall at least an entirely new arming and
firing system, but the physics package was intact.

In contrast, some later PALs were supposed to damage the nuclear
components to a point that they would only be useful as (possibly
contaminated) raw materials. One example cited was that a
neutron-absorbing safety wire or rod, normally retracted from the inside
of the hollow pit during the firing process, could be broken off inside
the pit if the PAL decided there was an unauthorized firing attempt.

"Howard Berkowitz" > wrote in message
...
> In article >, "Kevin Brooks"
> > wrote:
>
>
> > It has been quite a few years since I sat through the very basic
lectures
> > we
> > received on the SADM (being in the very last EOBC class to go through
> > that
> > phase), but IIRC the PAL was set up such that failure to input the
proper
> > code would result in the device inerting itself.
>
> From my recollection of open sources, the inerting was of the arming
> mechanism, not the actual nuclear components. In other words, to use it,
> you'd have to build and reinstall at least an entirely new arming and
> firing system, but the physics package was intact.
>
> In contrast, some later PALs were supposed to damage the nuclear
> components to a point that they would only be useful as (possibly
> contaminated) raw materials. One example cited was that a
> neutron-absorbing safety wire or rod, normally retracted from the inside
> of the hollow pit during the firing process, could be broken off inside
> the pit if the PAL decided there was an unauthorized firing attempt.

I don't know. This has gotten way beyond my actual knowledge, which was
limited to what little they taught us during that couple of days at the ADM
training site, and what little I have read in open sources since then (which
you have totake with a grain of salt, since a couple of the leading sources
could not even agree on the critter's actual weight with and without its
casing). They did not get very specific with the PAL details, as we had no
need to know them, other than to mention that it would render the device
unusable if the code was improperly input (I would presume it gave you X
attempts to get it right). Heck, even the calculations we ran for the depth
of placment were all based upon theoretical/assumed yields--they did not
give out the actual yields except as a rather wide range within which the
actual values fell. The last overseas ADM company drew down while I was
still on active duty, IIRC, quickly followed by the last ADM company
army-wide (which was located at FT Hood, again IIRC). My last active duty
company CO had been assigned to the one in Italy--he never provided any
details, either (understandably) other than to say that the biggest thing he
as a lieutenant did was repetitive inspections and inventories of the
weapons they had custody of (SADM and MADM).

Brooks

Am Sat, 28 Feb 2004 00:02:47 -0500, schrieb "Kevin Brooks"
> :

>In the event of war, these reserve demolition targets would be prepared by
>German personnel from the WBK (a quasi-military structured German civil
>service organization, IIRC).

Thanks to all for clearing up something I was wondering about for some
time. BTW, the WBK is AFAIK the territorial army (not part of NATO),
which would have "garrision duty" in case of a war within German
borders (organising callup of reserves, protecting key installations
and so on).
Owe
--
My from-adress is valid and being read.
www.owejessen.de

"Owe Jessen" > wrote in message
...
> Am Sat, 28 Feb 2004 00:02:47 -0500, schrieb "Kevin Brooks"
> > :
>
> >In the event of war, these reserve demolition targets would be prepared
by
> >German personnel from the WBK (a quasi-military structured German civil
> >service organization, IIRC).
>
> Thanks to all for clearing up something I was wondering about for some
> time. BTW, the WBK is AFAIK the territorial army (not part of NATO),
> which would have "garrision duty" in case of a war within German
> borders (organising callup of reserves, protecting key installations
> and so on).

They sure seemed to be an integral part of NATO when their rep briefed our
engineer OBC class back during the mid-eighties. I am not sure how any
element of the West German armed forces could have been labled as not being
"part of NATO"? We expected to work with them if the situation had ever
turned nasty, and I am pretty sure that in the event of war they reported to
the responsible military commander for their respective areas.

Brooks

> Owe
> --
> My from-adress is valid and being read.
> www.owejessen.de

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
. ..
> False reporting gave the Soviets (and western intel
> shops) wildly optimistic views of Soviet readiness states that started to
> evaporate in Afghanistan.
>
And of course once the truth was known, the Reagan-era pentagon was still
spinning the story for the public and congress of the growing Soviet threat
and how that were building a blue-water navy, so we needed a 600 ship navy
to counter.

Source: "Fall from Glory: The men who sank the U.S. Navy" by Gregory L.
Vistica (1996)

"james_anatidae" > wrote:

>"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
. ..
>> False reporting gave the Soviets (and western intel
>> shops) wildly optimistic views of Soviet readiness states that started to
>> evaporate in Afghanistan.
>>
>And of course once the truth was known, the Reagan-era pentagon was still
>spinning the story for the public and congress of the growing Soviet threat
>and how that were building a blue-water navy, so we needed a 600 ship navy
>to counter.

The problem is, that unlike an Army, a Navies readiness can be
discerned much more easily. Either it is at sea, or it is not.
Either it is cruising, or it is moored.

And in fact, across the 80's, the Soviet was at sea in increasing
numbers and increasing activity. And in fact they were moving
steadily towards building a blue-water Navy, and increasing in ability
to interfere should a second Battle of the Atlantic occur.

D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

(Peter Stickney) wrote in message >...
> In article >,
> (Tom Adams) writes:
> > (Tom Adams) wrote in message >...
> >> "james_anatidae" > wrote in message >...
> >> > I was wondering at about what point that the United States going to war with
> >> > the Soviet Union become an almost certain act of mutual destruction. I'm
> >> > assuming it sometime in 1960's or 70's, since what I've seen of the Soviet
> >> > nuclear capability before that point doesn't seem to be all that
> >> > threatening. It looks like they would have been really bad for us
> >> > Americans, but not unsurvivable.
> >>
> >> I think October 23, 1961 is a watershed date. That is the day that
> >> the Soviet Union exploded the Tsar Bomba, the largest bomb ever
> >> exploded.
> >>
> >> Note that the yield of this bomb did not represent the technical limit
> >> on the yield of a hydrogen bomb. It is my understanding that there is
> >> no known limit. Instead, the Tsar Bomba represents a kind of
> >> political limit in a historical context. After the Tsar Bomba, the
> >> politicians on both side put on the brakes.
> >
> > It was possible to create a threat to kill everyone in the US or the
> > USSR almost instantly (on a clear day, anyway) between 1962 and 1965,
> > by deploying space-based high-yield orbiting hydrogen bombs.
> >
> > But no such threat was ever developed. I am not sure what
> > considerations prevented the development of such a threat.
>
> Size and Weight. Nobody was capable of putting a 30-40 ton warhead of
> that size at those heights. Well, that, and atmospheric attenuation -
> all the prompt stuff, and the heat, gets absobed pretty quickly by the
> Atmosphere, and there'd be no fallout. There would, if you chose the
> right height, be pretty severe EMP effects, but you don't need a
> whopping huge bomb for that.

In a rough translation from LEO weight to ICBM throw weight I can see
the SL-12 Proton and variants delivering something in the 30 T range
as an ICBM. IIRC that was what its justification was for Khurshchev.
Comparison, SS-9 6 T ICBM warhead,, 4 T to LEO as SL-11 (and
variants), SL-12 (Proton) 42T to LEO.

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/icbm/r-36.htm SS-9
http://www.braeunig.us/space/specs/proton.htm SL-12

Am Sat, 28 Feb 2004 22:45:38 -0500, schrieb "Kevin Brooks"
> :
>>
>> Thanks to all for clearing up something I was wondering about for some
>> time. BTW, the WBK is AFAIK the territorial army (not part of NATO),
>> which would have "garrision duty" in case of a war within German
>> borders (organising callup of reserves, protecting key installations
>> and so on).
>
>They sure seemed to be an integral part of NATO when their rep briefed our
>engineer OBC class back during the mid-eighties. I am not sure how any
>element of the West German armed forces could have been labled as not being
>"part of NATO"? We expected to work with them if the situation had ever
>turned nasty, and I am pretty sure that in the event of war they reported to
>the responsible military commander for their respective areas.
>

I mean in the sense they were not under command of NATO, but of the
ministry of defense. All German field units were part of the integral
command structure, but the territorial units were under German
command. Everything AFAIR, of course. :-)
Owe
--
My from-adress is valid and being read.
www.owejessen.de